The bridge was part of I-695, a major thoroughfare around Baltimore with at least 30,000 vehicles a day using the bridge. It served as a major route for hazardous chemicals that cannot be transported through the area tunnels.

From April 1 to September 21, vehicles going around the bridge have spent over 2.6 million more hours in traffic than before, which equates to lost time of $108 million, not including the cost of fuel or the environmental impact of emissions. Over the course of the time needed to rebuild the bridge, that number could exceed $1 billion.

Overall, some 51,000 people rely on the port, either directly or indirectly, for their jobs. There are smaller marinas in the river, boat tour companies, and many restaurants and shops. In total, there are as many as 20,000 jobs connected to port operations, including truck drivers and warehouse workers, with 8,000 jobs directly associated with port operations, generating $2 million a day in wages. The closure as a whole cost $191 million per day in lost economic activity. The state set up a dedicated unemployment line for affected workers, and the governor approved $60 million in temporary assistance to workers and businesses. Many residents are still out of work, and local neighborhoods are facing significantly increased traffic as commuters, including trucks, look for routes that go around the bridge.

Liabilities/Affected Parties

The ship’s owners expected extraordinarily high costs from the salvage operations, and have indicated that they expect the owners of the cargo on board to participate in those expenses via general average. The ship owners kept all containers onboard and under their control until security arrangements had been made with the adjusters for general average and salvage.

General average centers around all parties to property in transit sharing in a loss. The costs that are part of general average calculation include the cost of losses incurred to move the ship to safety, damage to cargo, tug and salvage operations, losses to containers themselves, and other expenses including crew and fuel.

If a cargo owner's share to the general average exceeds the value of the goods, they generally walk away from the cargo.

There are many others involved for potential liabilities, as well as those being impacted by the collapse as follows:

The State of Maryland - The Brawner construction workers were hired by the state to make repairs to the bridge surface. In that connection, the state and the construction company bear responsibility to provide a safe workplace for those workers, so vicarious liability will likely be assigned to both.

Brawner Company - The employer of the construction workers, who will be liable for workers compensation benefits to the eight workers or their families. Wrongful death suits will likely be filed by the families of the six deceased workers. So far, $38,000 has been paid to the surviving workers for medical bills by the workers comp carrier.

Grace Ocean Private. Ltd., Singapore - Owner of the Dali and Synergy Marine Pte. Ltd. - Singapore - Manager of the Dali - Liability exposures abound and claims can be asserted by or from any person or business affected in any way by the collision and collapse. The ship is covered by the Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Ltd., or Britannia P&I Club. Protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs are mutual insurance organizations that insure and pool liability for the global shipping industry.

The coverage provides protection for practically all maritime liability risks associated with the ownership and operation of a vessel, including third-party risks for damage caused to cargo during transit, and risks of environmental damage such as pollution, war, and political risks.

Individual P&I clubs retain $10 million on any claim, and claims in excess of $10 million are shared between the group clubs. For claims in excess of $30 million, the International Group pool is also reinsured by Bermuda-domiciled group captive Hydra Insurance Co. Ltd., an incorporated cell company.

The property loss of the ship itself and its damaged and delayed cargo could be covered by hull and machinery insurance. Hull and machinery insurance provides physical damage protection for the ships, vessels, and their machinery.

A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S - Confirmed that it had chartered the Dali for Synergy Marine. However, seeing as it didn’t own or manage the ship, and none of its employees were on board, the company likely has no liability. They may still potentially be affected by defense costs if they are named in a suit.

Owners of the containers being shipped - These parties face property damage and business interruption losses. Some containers were damaged in the accident, and there could be damage to the goods inside. The delivery of those items on the ship was also delayed. Claims for such damages should be covered by the ship’s P&I insurance.

Owners of the vehicles destroyed in the collapse - The P&I insurance should cover these types of losses. However, vehicle damage could otherwise be covered by the owners’ insurance. Personal auto, business auto, motor carriers, truckers physical damage losses, and possible business interruption loss could be involved.

Businesses now rerouting hazardous cargo such as flammable liquids, or oversized vehicles, that can’t go through the tunnel - they face shipping delays.

Insurance 

Ace American/Chubb Ltd. is the lead property insurer on the bridge and issued a payment of $350 million last August. The insurer is filing for reimbursement of the $350,000 from Grace Ocean and Synergy.

The attorneys for the owners and managers of the Dali have submitted court filings asking a judge to excuse them from any liability or to cap the damages at $43 to 44 million, which is the value of the vessel minus damage and salvage. This filing is based on the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, aka the Titanic law, since the doomed vessel’s owner invoked it to limit payouts when the Titanic sank. The act allows a vessel owner to limit liability to the value of the ship itself and its cargo; it can only be invoked if the owner can prove they had no knowledge of the negligence that caused the accident.

In their petition, the attorneys deny any liability for the accident, asserting that the disaster was not due to any fault, neglect, or want of care on the part of the vessel or its owners and managers. If the claim is successful, it could set a new precedent in maritime law. The Limitation of Liability Act of 1852 requires the crew to prove that they didn’t know of a problem beforehand. It would release the owners from hundreds of millions in damage claims.

However, expert admiralty lawyers say that the next few years of litigation over the Dali will likely center on whether the owner might have known about a causal factor behind the accident.

If it’s proven that the owners knew the ship was faulty, it would allow a judge to "break" the limitation of liability, and plaintiffs (potentially including the U.S. government) would be able to pursue far higher damage claims against the owner and insurers. Supportive information will include the information contained in the recovered voyage box recorder, the FBI findings, and the discoveries of the hired law firms.

Litigation 

An attorney for Grace Ocean Private and Synergy Marine, the companies owning and managing the Dali, claim there was significant liability and fault on the state of Maryland for failing to properly protect the bridge. The attorney also claimed the ship builder bears some fault due to the electrical system that malfunctioned as the ship was underway.

The companies have also hired a lobbying firm to fight against proposed changes to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, under which they’re seeking protection from the loss.

A total of 46 lawsuits have been filed against Grace Ocean and Synergy, including suits by the Justice Department, the state of Maryland, the city of Baltimore, the families of the deceased workers, and others. The suits argue that Grace Ocean and Synergy should be held fully responsible since they allowed an unseaworthy vessel to sail.

In September, the US Department of Justice stated in its claim against the boat owners that the ship was unseaworthy and that the accident was entirely avoidable. The department sought $103 million for river cleanup and recovery efforts and unspecified punitive damages. The department’s suit stated that inspections of the ship after the accident showed loose bolts, nuts and washers, and broken electrical cable ties in the transformers and electrical switchboards. The electrical equipment was in such poor condition the electrical testing was halted due to safety concerns. The poor repairs kept the backup systems from engaging when the primary transformer malfunctioned.

The Justice Department settled its claim for $102 million in late October. The funds will go to the U.S. Treasury and federal agencies. This settles claims under the Rivers and Harbors Act, Oil Pollution Act, and general maritime law. The funds are coming from Grace Ocean Private Ltd and Synergy Marine Private Ltd. The two companies maintain that the settlement was for cleanup costs, and they do not admit any liability for the accident. Grace Ocean also paid $97,294 to the Coast Guard National Pollution Fund Center for costs incurred to abate the threat of oil pollution arising from the incident.

Maryland claims in its lawsuit that the companies pressured crews to make shoddy repairs to limit vibrations to the transformer, a critical part of the electrical system, and that the crews failed to disclose previous power outages and falsely told port pilots that everything was in good working order. Maryland claims that the ship owners failed to address defects in the months before the loss, and that they are guilty of reckless conduct, mismanagement, negligence, and incompetence; the state wants to hold them accountable for the damages.

The Maryland lawsuit is looking for a range of damages - part of the cleanup, the estimated $1.7 billion to rebuild the bridge, lost toll revenues, environmental damage to state waters under state and federal law including Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and increased wear and tear on alternate routes for traffic that would have used the bridge. The case has been split into two parts, the first to determine liability, and the second to determine damages.

Legal experts state that the question of limiting liability boils down to whether the Singapore companies had privity and knowledge of the problems on the ship before it set sail.

The victims’ lawsuit makes similar claims, that the vehicle had a well-recorded history of severe and dangerous vibration issues that affected the electrical system and rendered it unseaworthy. Workers supposedly used haphazard methods to limit vibrations to the transformers, and the braces used were themselves damaged by the vibration.

Brawner, the employer of the victims, has filed suit as well, asking the court to deny the ship owners’ request to limit their liability to the salvage value of the ship. Brawner is looking to recover the financial impacts of the loss of employees, injuries to the survivor, and the loss of vehicles, equipment, and tools that fell into the river.

Baltimore has its own suit for damages, but it’s not as easy for the city to make a case for damages. Based on the 1923 case Robins Dry Dock Repair Co. v. Flint, the parties who can recover damages in a maritime calamity is limited to those entities that suffered direct, physical damage. The owner of the bridge, the state of Maryland, obviously suffered damage.

Baltimore is claiming that a 6-foot diameter pipe ran parallel to the fallen span of the bridge and was damaged in the collapse; the pipe was closed due to the collapse and the clearing of the channel prevented early repairs. However, there is some confusion as to whether the pipe was in use or was inactive, making it important to Baltimore’s claim. Baltimore is also claiming that the alternate roadways being used by commercial trucks and vehicles are taking a toll on those roads.

However, because of the Robins Dry Dock rule, economic consequences are exempted unless the damages can be directly tied to the physical damage resulting from the calamity. Baltimore passed a law looking to fortify its legal footing, but experts are skeptical. Damage to the water main would allow Baltimore to receive some compensation to the pipe, but likely not for wear on roadways. Baltimore’s suit does not specify the amount of damages the city is seeking.

A group of longshoremen filed a class action suit for lost wages while the port was closed after the bridge collapsed. While the port was opened 2 months after the loss occurred, even six months later port traffic had not returned to predisaster levels. The longshoremen rely on the flow of cargo vessels for income. The men are seeking lost wages as well as punitive damages.

Support

Various groups have provided financial support to the local community and businesses.

Estimates to rebuild the bridge fall between $1.7 - 1.9 billion. Other liabilities could range from $350-$700 million for wrongful death, business interruption and other related expenses. The total loss is expected to be between $3 and $4 billion, making this tragedy the largest marine insurance loss ever recorded.

The Transportation Department authorized $600 million for immediate relief from the emergency relief fund. The Army Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies assumed the cost of clearing the bridge debris out of the river.

Crews started surveying the Patapsco river in January to collect data for designing a new bridge, including topographical and underwater surveys and soil sampling. Kiewit Infrastructure, out of Nebraska, has been picked to build the new bridge. Construction is slated to begin this spring, with a completion date of 2028, and it was announced in January that the bridge will be a cable-stayed design.

There is a federal commitment to provide funding for replacing the bridge, though some of those costs could be recouped from insurers and litigation against the owners of the Dali. In general, the default is that the federal government pays for 90 percent of highways, and the state pays the remaining 10 percent.

Investigations

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recovered the voyage data recorder and began an investigation that included the structure of the bridge and surrounding protective devices and the ship’s safety history and records. On Thursday, March 20, 2025, investigators said the bridge was at a high risk of collapsing if struck by a ship, but that Maryland officials had never conducted a review and lacked the data to do one. The NTSB calculated the bridge’s risk of collapse after a strike was almost 30 times higher than the threshold set by national standards. Those standards were established years after the Francis Scott Key Bridge was built and did not apply to the bridge.

The investigation has shown that the location of the bridge left the ship’s crew little time to adjust if they got off course, that the barriers did not provide full protection to the piers, and that the piers were not strong enough to withstand a hit from a large, modern ship. The bridge was built in 1977; since then, container ships have increased significantly in size. Maryland does not regularly run evaluations of bridges for ship strikes on already built bridges.

Collision risk analyses were recommended in 1991 and 2009. If safety reviews had been taken at that time, steps could have been taken to possibly prevent the disaster that occurred almost one year ago. The investigation is ongoing. The state of Maryland maintains that the fault of the accident lies squarely with the owner of the ship that struck the bridge. Maryland Governor Wes Moore has stated that the cause of the collision was the sole fault of the Dali and the reckless operators. He stated that the bridge has passed every federal assessment for over 30 years. In response to the report, the Maryland Transportation Authority said that the collapse was due to gross negligence of the ship's owners and operators.

As far as the ship is concerned, the NTSB has discovered a loose cable that could have caused electrical issues; the investigation continues. Other electrical equipment was found to be in poor condition.

After the disaster, the Coast Guard has launched a review of risks to infrastructure posed by larger ships, and is focusing on 10 ports. The NTSB has called on the Coast Guard to work with the Federal Highway Administration and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to help local authorities and states evaluate the risks of area bridges and develop plans to reduce hazards.

The FBI also opened a criminal investigation on April 15, 2024 and has been looking at whether the crew knew the ship had problems when it left port that day. As of December 2024, criminal charges have not been brought, and the investigation is ongoing.

Summary

The collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge after being struck by a container ship brought the state of infrastructure to the forefront. There are 309 major bridges on navigable waterways in the US. Inspections have found many protection systems deteriorating, outdated, or nonexistent, leaving more bridges exposed to risk. There are 193 bridges carrying 10,000 or more vehicles a day with no protection around piers. Similar accidents have happened in Tampa Bay, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; South Padre Island Texas; and Webbers Falls, Oklahoma.

The NTSB has recommended that the owners of 68 bridges across 19 states conduct a vulnerability test to determine the risk of bridge collapse based on the investigation into the Baltimore incident. The bridges, similar to the Francis Scott Key Bridge, were built before The American Association of Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) safety guidelines were established. The recommendation is that the bridges be assessed for vulnerability; and if the bridges are outside the recommended limits, that a comprehensive risk reduction plan be established.

Further still, if the ship owners are successful in limiting their liability to the value of the vessel after repairs and salvage, plus pending freight, it could set a precedent in maritime law and redefine liability limits. Its outcome could also govern future disaster response approaches and shipping industry business models. Regardless, the loss to insurers and reinsurers will be comprehensive and expensive, and will likely lead to changes and tightening in the marine insurance market.

In 2021, legislation was pushed through to provide $40 billion to repair or replace bridges across the country - but the repairs are targeted at roughly one-third of the estimated 43,000 bridges considered to be in poor condition. Some states are focusing more on rapid evacuation in the event of a ship strike, while others are working on improving navigation and tugboat protocols to lessen the likelihood of collisions. Others are hoping they get lucky. Many bridges were built before more modern standards for protecting bridges were put in place. Many bridges are now being reviewed after the Baltimore accident. About half the bridges with deficient pier protection were also “fracture critical”, which means that the failure of a key component would probably cause a wider collapse of the bridge.

As for the bridge itself, federal guidelines currently require bridges over a navigable waterway to be protected from a potential vessel strike. Among the safeguards are “dolphins,” or independent barriers, meant to deflect a straying ship away from a bridge’s piers, and “fenders” that attach to piers to absorb a vessel’s impact. The Key Bridge predates these guidelines, though it was built with a set of concrete and wood barriers around its vertical supports that absorbed a containership strike in 1980. This accident could lead to even greater requirements in the protection of bridge construction.