Badler filed a negligence-based suit against the university in Franklin County Superior Court in October 2019.

The university moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity from liability based on the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA), because the mixer did not fall under the 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1)(G), exception to immunity, stating a government entity could be held liable for its acts or omissions in its "ownership, maintenance or use" of motor vehicles, special mobile equipment, trailers, aircraft, watercraft, snowmobiles or "other machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary."

Badler argued that the university was not immune because the alleged negligent act fell within the MTCA's exception for negligence related to the university's "ownership, maintenance, or use of … [o]ther machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary," the opinion said.

Judge Nancy Mills granted the university's motion, concluding it was immune under the MTCA because the mixer did not fall within the equipment exception.

Badler appealed.

The state high court has interpreted the "[o]ther machinery or equipment" provision in section 8104-A(1)(G) as it related to a hypodermic syringe used to draw blood from a patient in McNally v. Town of Freeport; an in-ground dumpster in Reid v. Town of Mount Vernon; a golf course sprinkler system in Petillo v. City of Portland; a fire protection system in J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland; and railroad tracks in Harris v. City of Old Town. 

However, none of those cases involved machinery or equipment that presented a risk of injury similar to those presented by the machines and equipment listed in sections (A) through (F), including motor vehicles, trailers, aircrafts, watercraft and others. 

But in a 3-1 majority opinion, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Badler's claim that a governmental entity would be liable for injuries caused by "virtually any machine or piece of equipment with a motor," the opinion said.

"We cannot conclude that a kitchen mixer falls within the same general class as the items enumerated in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F)," Associate Justice Andrew M. Horton wrote on behalf of the majority. "Other than being a machine, the mixer does not meet the criteria we defined in [the Maine Supreme Court's 1999 ruling in] New Orleans Tanker [Corp. v. Dep't of Transp.]: it is not a transportation device, it is unlikely to be transported, it is unlikely to come into contact with the general public, and it is unlikely to be covered by an insurance policy."

"The mixer also poses a risk of injury different from the risk associated with the items in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F) … ," Horton continued. "Although a mixer does pose a risk of injury, that risk is inherently different than the risk associated with, for example, a motor vehicle."

The majority said its conclusion is in line with more than 40 years of precedent, as the Legislature never amended 8104-A(1)(G). If the Legislature intended such a broader reach, it would "have had no reason to enumerate separately the motorized vehicles and equipment in subsections (A) through (F) of section 8104-A(1)."

In a dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Joseph M. Jabar said he would vacate the trial court's order and remand it for the court to consider whether the risk of injury resulting from the negligent operation of the industrial mixer is comparable to the risk of injury arising from the negligent operation of the items enumerated in section 8104-A(1).

"In deciding this mixed question of fact and law, the trial court should have considered at least the following risk-based factors: whether the industrial mixer is motorized, how big it is, how a person interacts with it, and the type of injuries the operator is likely to sustain if the mixer malfunctions," Jabar wrote.

Additionally, he took issue with the majority's reliance on New Orleans Tanker limiting the scope of exception to immunity only to items relating to transportation, which has "never been a part of our risk analysis."

"Nowhere in the MTCA does the statute condition immunity on whether the item comes into contact with the public …," Jabar wrote. "Instead, the Court cites New Orleans Tanker for this proposition. … In that case, the Court described the listed items in section 8104-A(1)(A)-(F) as 'likely to come into contact with the general public' and concluded that '[t]he general public does not come into contact with … bridge leaf machinery in the same way that the public comes into contact with governmental vehicles of the type enumerated in the statute.'"

Laura A. Maher, of Monaghan Leahy, declined to comment on Wednesday on behalf of the university.

A message seeking comment was not immediately returned from Badler's attorney, Christiane D. Williams of Mann Law.