The New Mexico Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that Section 51-1-41(C) and -42(A)(4) of the state's workers' compensation act treated workers with secondary mental impairments differently than those with secondary physical impairments—in turn, violating workers' equal protection rights.

"We agree with [Cardenas] that the act discriminates between secondary mental impairments and secondary physical impairments, in violation of the equal protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution," Judge Jane B. Yohalem wrote on behalf of the panel, remanding the case to the workers' compensation administration.

Cardenas' attorney, Victor Titus of Titus & Murphy Law Firm, said that the court made the right decision.

"[It's a] good decision which makes sure psychological injuries are paid no different than other non-scheduled injuries," he told Law.com on Friday.

According to the appellate court's opinion, Cardenas suffered a knee injury during a workplace accident in January 2016. A psychological evaluation later determined that her psychological impairment was "causally related" to the workplace injury and that she was "15% disabled" by the psychological impairment.

Cardenas filed a workers' compensation claim for both her primary knee injury and for a secondary mental impairment caused by the workplace injury, the opinion said. While the school didn't dispute the facts of the case, they disputed the length of time she should receive compensation benefits for her secondary mental impairment, according to the opinion.

Under New Mexico law, the duration of partial disability benefits for a secondary mental impairment is limited to the number of weeks allowable for the worker's original physical injury.

When the primary physical injury is to a scheduled body part, the worker is limited to the duration of benefits listed in Section 52-1-43 for an injury to that body part, ranging from seven to 200 weeks, according to the appeals court.

However, if there is a secondary physical injury, the duration of the partial disability benefits depends on "the nature and extent" of the injury.

The appellate court panel—including Judges Yohalem, J. Miles Hanisee and Gerald E. Baca—looked to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal School, which held that workers with a primary mental impairment are similarly situated to workers with a primary physical impairment.

Considering the decision in Breen, the appellate court sought to determine whether Cardenas' secondary mental impairment is similarly situated to workers with secondary physical impairments.

"We see no difference related to the purposes of the [Workers' Compensation] Act between workers with subsequently arising secondary physical disabilities that are casually connected to a compensable work-related accidental injury, and workers with 'secondary mental impairments' as defined by the act," Yohalem wrote. "The workers in both groups have become secondarily impaired as a result of an original work-related accidental injury and both groups have lost earnings as a result of their secondary disability.

"They are thus similarly situated with regard to the act's purpose: to provide workers compensation for earning capacity lost or diminished due to a disability caused by and resulting from a work-related accidental injury. See Breen, 2005-NMSC-028," she continued.

The appellate court further said that the employer did not carry its burden of showing that the act's disparate treatment of mentally impaired workers is substantially related to an important government interest.

The defendants' attorney, Joshua A. Collins of Allen, Shepherd, Lewis & Syra, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.