A Texas Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor of Old Republic Insurance Company, rejecting a workers' compensation death benefits claim for an employee killed in a car accident while driving home from work in a company-owned vehicle. The case is Darling v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 2026 LX 397485 (Tex. App. 2026).
Background
James E. Darling worked as an instrumentation and electrical technician at Energy Transfer's Rebel Plant, a gas processing facility located between Midland and Garden City. On April 25, 2019, equipment outages forced Darling and his colleagues to work overtime, working beyond the normal 3:30 p.m. end of his shift.
At 8:38 p.m., Darling texted his wife, Teresa, that he was on his way home. He was killed in a car accident while driving the company vehicle home. Darling's wife, Teresa D. Darling, sought death benefits from Old Republic, Energy Transfer's workers' compensation carrier. Old Republic denied the claim, contending Darling was not acting in the course and scope of his employment when he died.
Darling's wife pursued the claim through the Texas Division of Workers' Compensation. An administrative law judge found that Darling was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that the claimants were not entitled to death benefits. A three-member appeals panel affirmed that decision. Ms. Darling then appealed in an appellate court.
Workers' Compensation Act
Under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, an employee is generally entitled to benefits when an injury "arises out of and in the course and scope of employment." State law, Texas Labor Code § 401.011(12), defines "course and scope of employment" as requiring that the activity both originate in the employer's business and be performed in furtherance of that business.
However, even when those elements are met, coverage can still be excluded under the "coming-and-going" rule, which excludes coming and going to work unless the transportation is furnished under the employment contract or paid for by the employer, the employer controls the means of transportation, or the employee is directed to travel from one place to another for work.
A separate "dual-purpose travel" rule can exclude trips mixing business and personal purposes unless the business purpose was both a necessary and sufficient reason for the trip.
Court of Appeals
The appellate court first had to determine if Darling was acting in the course and scope of his employment. Teresa Darling argued her husband's drive home fell outside the coming-and-going exclusion because Energy Transfer supplied the vehicle and controlled its use. Old Republic countered that the exclusions were irrelevant because Darling's commute never satisfied the first requirement that his commute originate in his employment.
Darling was not traveling to a job site or on any work errand, he was driving straight home, unpaid, after his shift had ended. There was no evidence that Energy Transfer directed or controlled how he used the vehicle that evening. In addition, the presence of Darling's work tools in the vehicle did not establish that his drive home was required by his job.
The court noted that merely furnishing a vehicle does not automatically bring an employee under workers' compensation coverage. If it did, then any accident in a company vehicle, even when used for personal reasons, would be compensable.
The court further determined that Darling's work as an I&E technician did not carry the kind of inherent exposure to road hazards associated with jobs like delivery driving or messenger work, where being on the road is a core part of the job itself.
The appellants pointed to cases in which the Texas Supreme Court determined that employees were acting in the course and scope of employment during work-related travel at the time of their injuries or deaths. The appellate court distinguished those cases from the current case.
In Leordeanu, a pharmaceutical sales representative was injured driving from a client dinner to a company storage unit, where she was to empty the company car of business supplies. These were both employer-related stops, so the court determined that she was in the course of employment.
In Orozco, a police sergeant crashed his patrol car while commuting home. The court found that he was in the course and scope of employment because under department policy, use of the car was only for "official business," and the sergeant was required to notify dispatch upon arrival home to state that he and the vehicle were no longer in service. In the case of James Darling, while the circumstances were similar, his use of the vehicle was not dictated by his employer at the time of the accident.
Editor's Note
The appellate court held Darling's commute did not originate in Energy Transfer's business and affirmed the decision of the trial court in granting summary judgment for Old Republic Insurance Company.
Since the first requirement of the workers' compensation statute was not met, the court did not need to determine whether the dual-purpose or coming-and-going exceptions applied, nor whether the exception to the exclusion for a company-provided car applied.
Read More:

