"We do not insure, however for loss:
2. Caused by:
e. Any of the following:
(5) Discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants unless the discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape is itself caused by a Peril Insured Against under Coverage C of this policy."

"Pollutants" was defined in the policy as: "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed."

The insurer denied the claim, arguing that the biological matter resulting from Randy Taylor's death constituted an irritant or contaminant, meaning that the pollution exclusion applied.

In response, the estate of Randall Lee Taylor filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The insurer filed for summary judgment, attempting to get the case dismissed.

Circuit Court

The insurer argued that the deceased body, which was not found until 10 days after Taylor's death, was a pollutant. The court first looked at the dictionary definition of pollutant.

Pulling from dictionary.com, pollutant was defined as "(1) something that pollutes. (2) any substance, as certain chemicals or waste products, that renders the air, soil, water or other natural resource harmful or unsuitable for a specific purpose."

The court believed that an ordinary, reasonable person would not consider a deceased body to be a pollutant under this definition. The insurer argued that a decaying body could fall under "irritant or contaminant." The policy's definition of pollutant stated, "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste."

The insurer claimed a contaminant is "a substance that can harm living organisms," and that the decaying body should qualify under that. The court disagreed, reasoning that if that definition were accepted, "practically all substances, including air and water, could be considered contaminants. This finding would open the flood gates to the denial of countless meritorious claims."

The court stated that a reasonable reading of the exclusion to an ordinary person would be that it excluded coverage for inorganic materials, such as some of the ones listed in the exclusion, like smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, and chemicals. An ordinary person would likely not believe the exclusion applied to organic substances such as human remains.

The court continued that if the insurer intended for human remains to be excluded from coverage, it would have explicitly stated so and listed it among the other substances.

In Nicholson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (E.D. Cal. 2013), the court found that the insurer did not show that the pollution exclusion in a homeowners policy applied to decaying bat carcasses. While not entirely similar, the case provided guidance on the application of the pollution exclusion to decaying carcasses.

The court ruled in favor of the estate of Randall Taylor and denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment.

Editor's Note

This case was significant in that it clarified that the standard homeowners pollution exclusion does not apply to human remains. The court found that the insurer did not demonstrate that the pollution exclusion includes human remains or other organic substances.

The court's decision was partially shaped by what an ordinary person would reasonably expect the policy to cover. The court determined that an ordinary person would not consider bodily remains the same as irritants, contaminants, or waste, or materials to be recycled, reconditioned, or reclaimed.

Read More:

Pollution Question over Gases Released from Dead Body

Total Pollution Exclusion Inapplicable to Damages Caused By Breath Drops

Dead Man's Claim: The Confusion of Clean-up