The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an injured worker is no longer entitled to workers' compensation benefits after refusing to assume a light-duty position. The case is State ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp., 2025 LX 548150 (Ohio 2025).

Background

Evangelo Papageorgiou worked for Avalotis Corporation. On May 25, 2018, while operating a sandblaster at work, he suffered an injury; a high-pressure blast resulted in cervical sprain and strain, and head contusion. Papageorgiou underwent surgery the same day. Avalotis continued paying his regular wages.

On June 5, 2018, one of the surgeons who performed surgery on Papageorgiou evaluated him and decided he could return to light-duty work with a "no-heavy-lifting" restriction. Weeks later, Papageorgiou's treating physician completed a MEDCO-14 Physician's Report of Work Ability form that listed several restrictions, including no bending, squatting, kneeling, twisting, turning, climbing, or lifting more than ten pounds, in addition to limited overhead reaching permitted.

Light-Duty Job Offer

On June 28, 2018, a project manager gave Papageorgiou a written light-duty job offer and asked him to start the next day. The offer letter stated that Avalotis would accommodate Papageorgiou with a no-heavy-lifting restriction. His duties would include sorting hardware, general housekeeping, serving as a crane or aerial lift spotter, assisting with traffic control, and managing general inventory.

On July 2, 2018, Papageorgiou's treating physician wrote a letter confirming that Papageorgiou was physically capable of performing the duties specified in the offer, provided the work was performed on the ground and did not involve prolonged overhead tasks or lifting more than twenty pounds.

Papageorgiou never reported to work for the light-duty position. He didn't refuse the offer; he simply never showed up. As a result, Avalotis stopped paying his wage and notified him that his employment had been deemed abandoned.

Administrative History

Papageorgiou formally requested temporary total disability (TTD) compensation. A district hearing officer (DHO) ruled in Papageorgiou's favor and granted TTD compensation starting June 29, 2018. The DHO reasoned that the light-duty job offer referenced the no heavy lifting restriction but did not address the other limitations in the MEDCO-14 such as bending, squatting, etc.

Upon appeal by Avalotis, a staff hearing officer (SHO) reversed the decision and denied TTD compensation after June 28. The SHO found that Papageorgiou voluntarily abandoned a light-duty position that his physician confirmed he was able to perform. Papageorgiou subsequently appealed but the Industrial Commission declined to hear it.

Papageorgiou filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals to force the Commission to grant him TTD. The Commission and Avalotis objected. The court sustained the objections and denied the writ. Papageorgiou appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

Ohio Supreme Court

Papageorgiou raised four arguments to the Ohio Supreme Court in asking it to approve the writ of mandamus and approve TTD compensation. The first was that the commission did not determine if the job offer was made in good faith. OAC Ann. 4121-3-32 defines a job offer as "a proposal, made in good faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker's residence..."

The court determined that because Papageorgiou never raised the issue during the Industrial Commission hearings, under Ohio law, he cannot bring it up later in court. The court acknowledged the commission never determined if the job was in good faith, but they did not err in doing so since the issue was not raised by the claimant.

The second argument was that Adm. Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b) states that a claimant's treating physician's indication that a claimant could return to suitable employment is grounds to terminate ongoing TTD compensation, but cannot prevent payment of an initial period of TTD compensation.

The statute says, "Temporary total disability may be terminated by a self-insured employer or the bureau of workers' compensation in the event of...the employee's treating physician finds that the employee is capable of returning to his former position of employment or other available suitable employment."

The court found the argument flawed since neither the commission nor the District Court relied on the statute. The court cited R.C. 4123.56(A), which states, "payment shall not be made for the period...when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer."

The court stated that "it is well settled that an administrative rule cannot add or subtract from the legislative enactment covering the same subject matter." Further, the two statutes were not contradictory, since in this scenario, the commission was asked to determine if the employee is entitled to benefits after not accepting a light-duty position while receiving wages.

The third argument was that the commission erred in finding that Papageorgiou abandoned his employment without first determining if he abandoned the entire workforce, as required in a previous case, State ex rel. Ohio State Univ. v. Pratt. Papageorgiou argued that there was no evidence that he voluntarily abandoned the entire workforce.

The Ohio Supreme Court found that the commission erred in labeling the situation as a voluntary abandonment, but held that the error was inconsequential because the decision to deny benefits ultimately came down to the refusal of suitable employment.

The final argument made by Papageorgiou was that the job offer was legally deficient because it did not detail the physical demands of the position. He pointed to Admin. Code 4121-3-32(A)(6), which requires a written job offer to "clearly specify the physical demands of the job."

The court rejected the argument because the requirement cited by Papageorgiou is only triggered when "the injured worker refuses an oral job offer and the employer intends to initiate proceedings to terminate temporary total disability compensation". Papageorgiou failed to prove that either of the requirements were present.

The Ohio Supreme Court found none of the arguments compelling and affirmed the District Court's judgment.

Editor's Note

The most important piece of evidence in the employer's favor was having written approval from the claimant's treating physician that he was capable of performing the duties of the new position. Even if the light-duty job offer didn't mention all of the claimant's physical restrictions, it was deemed to be suitable employment.

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