We will pay all sums the insured is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle. The damages must result from bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident. The owner's or driver's liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.

Allmerica argued that the damages must have resulted from bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident and that the underinsured’s liability for the damage must have resulted from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle.

Allmerica claimed that Pennsylvania courts have historically interpreted “resulting from” to mean proximately caused by. They claim that benefits should only be paid if the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle proximately caused the death of Hunt.

Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Laws

The Hunts argued that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) requires a generous interpretation of coverage in favor of injured claimants in ambiguous cases and that the insurance contract’s causal standard was in violation of the MVFRL’s more liberal causal standard.

The MVFRL states that UIM coverage must “provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles.”

This is more generous from the language of the insurance contract, which provides coverage only for liability that results from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Pennsylvania courts have held “arising out of” to mean causally connected with, not proximately caused by.

The Court’s Ruling

Since the policy’s causal standard is in contradiction of the MVFRL, the court decided the policy must follow the standard set by the law—the “but for” standard. This means for Allmerica’s motion to dismiss to be successful, they would need to prove that Amarsingh’s use of his vehicle was not the cause of Hunt’s death.

Allmerica asserted that no matter which causation standard was used, whether the one set in the policy or the one set in MVFRL, the injury must be vehicle-caused. They argued the gunshot was an intervening act and not caused by the movement of the vehicle or in any way attributable to the use of the vehicle.

However, in prior cases, courts have found "vehicle-caused" to mean there is some causal connection between the vehicle and the injury. There was no necessity for interaction with the vehicle itself for there to be coverage.

Since the facts of this case were so unique, it was hard for either party or the court to find relevant case law. There was no prior case law that involved an accidental shooting where each party was in separate vehicles on a roadway.

In one case, Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos. v. Bakaric, 513 A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), a husband shot his wife during an argument as they were getting into a parked car. The court ruled the auto insurer was not liable for the wife’s damages since they did not result from or arise out of the use of the vehicle.

However, the court notes key differences between the Bakaric case and this case. First, the Bakaric case was decided in 1986 before the enactment of the MVFRL. The court states this does not necessarily mean the case would have been ruled differently, but the causation standard would have been different.

The Bakaric case also involves a domestic dispute and intentionally unlawful actions. There was only one vehicle involved, and the vehicle was parked with the engine off at the time the wife was shot. The court states that the car just happened to be the location of the accident.

In contrast, in this case, there were two vehicles both in use and on a roadway at the time of the incident, and according to police investigation, the shooting was an accident and not intentional.

Allmerica cited other cases, but the court remarked that all of those cases involved intentional shootings or altercations that happened while the vehicles involved were not in use. In some cases the car is “the mere situs” of the accident, or the location of the accident. That is not the case in this situation since the injury took place in another car out of Amarsingh’s vehicle. Further, both vehicles were clearly in use at the time of the accident, and the shooting was accidental.

Finally, the court looked at whether the vehicle was regularly used to transport the firearm and whether the shot was the result of negligence. The court found that other cases have considered the transportation of firearms to be an ordinary and customary use of a motor vehicle.

Amarsingh had previously told the police that he only had the gun for a week before the shooting. During that time, he carried the weapon in his car when going to work. Amarsingh also stated he attempted to unload the gun while stopped at the red light as a safety precaution since his kids generally greet him when he gets home from work.

Based on those findings, the court concluded that the vehicle was regularly used to transport a firearm, a legitimate and intended purpose of the vehicle, and that the accidental firing was the result of negligent, unintentional conduct. The court ruled that Amarsingh’s use of his vehicle was the “but for” cause of the death and denied Allmerica’s motion.

Editor’s Note: The court recognized that the case was a close one and that the law requires that in doubtful insurance cases, courts should rule in favor of the insured since insurance contracts are typically contracts of adhesion. They also stated that insurers presumably have the consumer information and actuarial resources to assess the potential risk of a driver, including whether they travel with a firearm.

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PA Supreme: Does Coverage Apply for Allegations of Unintentional Shooting