A district court determined that an insurer is not obligated to provide coverage for false statements by an insured based on a professional services exclusion. The case is Speckin Forensics, LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153301 (S.D. Fla. 2025).
The Suit That Started It All
In 2013, Harold Peerenboom–who is not part of the present case–filed a civil suit in state court against individuals who had each penned hateful letters to Peerenbloom accusing him of various crimes. In building his case, he sent some of the letters to Speckin Forensics, LLC for potential DNA analysis. Speckin, in turn, enlisted the services of GenQuest, LLC, specifically those of Elmer Otteson, to perform the requested analysis. One of the Peerenboom defendants subsequently sued Speckin after the company found her DNA on one of the hateful letters.
During the trial, Otteson testified he had analyzed uncontaminated DNA samples that had produced findings based on reliable evidence. He gave more testimony to the same effect multiple times as the trial progressed. But seven years later, the proverbial other shoe dropped when Otteson admitted at least some of the DNA samples had potentially been contaminated, and his subsequent analysis was unreliable because it was based in part on faulty evidence. The Peerenbloom defendant’s suit against Speckin was settled shortly thereafter.
The Other Underlying Suit
Speckin, in turn, sued GenQuest for negligence and breach of contract based on the roles it and Otteson had played in the Peerenboom suit. The lawsuit also included claims for all of the costs Speckin had incurred as a result of the Peerenbloom suit. The case ended in a default judgment against GenQuest for more than $875,000. At the time this decision was issued–early August 2025–exactly $0 and 0 cents of that award had been paid to Speckin.
The Instant Case
In early 2025, Speckin sought payment from Twin City Fire Insurance Company, who had provided coverage to GenQuest during the relevant period. The company claimed GenQuest’s and Otteson’s publication of the false statements regarding the DNA analysis in the Peerenboom case had “disparaged the quality and value of Speckin's reputation and goodwill” by association with the falsified data through GenQuest. Therefore, the claim was covered as a “personal and advertising injury” under the Twin City policy. Twin City countered that the claim had arisen from GenQuest’s provision of its professional DNA analysis services and was therefore precluded from coverage under the policy’s professional services exclusion. The claim was denied, which prompted Speckin to file suit.
Litigation
To survive a motion to dismiss, Speckin would have to prove facts that, if accepted by the court as true, showed it was possible for the claim to be covered, thereby rendering Twin City’s claim denial improper.
Both Twin City and the court pointed out that Speckin did not raise the question of whether GenQuest’s DNA analysis in the Peerenboom case had been a professional service. Speckin agreed it had been, but argued that its allegations were rooted in the misrepresentations published by Otteson, rather than the provision of professional services. The policy stated it would indemnify GenQuest for “‘personal and advertising injury’” that resulted from GenQuest’s business. The policy definition clarified that “‘personal and advertising injury’” referred to “an injury … arising out of one or more of the following offenses …. Oral, written, or electronic publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products, or services” (emphasis added). Therefore, according to Speckin, the claims arose from a “personal and advertising injury,” meaning the claims were covered by the Twin City policy, and the insurer had committed breach when it denied Speckin’s claim because Speckin was a third-party beneficiary on the policy.
Even if the claims did arise from the provision of professional services, argued Speckin, the professional services exclusion was illusory because it would preclude coverage for the vast majority of GenQuest’s services. Their entire purpose was “engaging in forensic and DNA analysis,” so there was little conduct that wouldn’t be subject to the professional services exclusion. Speckin maintained it was the defamatory statements made by Otteson that had caused Speckin’s injury, not the DNA analysis services.
The court did not disagree that the professional services exclusion in GenQuest’s policy was a broad one. However, the judge stated that breadth alone was insufficient to make an exclusion illusory. For example, Twin City acknowledged that, had GenQuest published a newspaper or magazine advertisement that impugned Speckin’s services or made unflattering false statements, those claims would potentially have been covered. Coverage could also have been available for damages that occurred on GenQuest’s premises, such as “an individual falling in GenQuest’s lab.”
Speckin agreed that DNA analysis was a professional service within the meaning of GenQuest’s policy, but the crux of the issue was not the provision of the services. Speckin’s claims focused on the falsehoods committed by Otteson; his continued support of the falsehoods prior to his admission had “resulted in significant harm to Speckin.” The court again did not disagree, and even admitted there was “some appeal” to the argument. However, even that appeal was not enough to surpass how the falsehoods themselves had arisen from the DNA analysis services Otteson had performed for Speckin. Since the harm arose from a professional service, it was subject to the “professional services” exclusion in the policy Twin City had issued to GenQuest.
Conclusion
The judge ultimately determined that the alleged damage to Speckin’s reputation had arisen from the provision of professional services by GenQuest. The lawsuit therefore fit within the “professional services” exclusion. Speckin’s lawsuit against GenQuest was dismissed with prejudice, meaning that Speckin could not rewrite the complaint and try again.
Editor’s Note: According to the opinion, Speckin also attempted to argue the policy was ambiguous, but failed to specify how it could be considered ambiguous. If litigation includes a question about the meaning of an undefined term, the court may rule the policy is ambiguous based on the lack of a definition for that term.
In this case, however, Speckin could not have argued the meaning of “professional services” was ambiguous because Twin City had strengthened the policy it sold to GenQuest by including a definition for “professional services.” Following the “professional services exclusion” in the policy, Twin City had “defined those services with more specificity in a non-exhaustive list” (emphasis added). Including a non-exhaustive list of what Twin City considered “professional services” clarified the application of the exclusion.