Gaudett's attorney, David J. Morrissey of Morrissey, Morrissey & Rydzik, did not respond to a request to comment.

Counsel for the defense, Joseph J. Passaretti, a partner at Montstream Law Group, declined to comment due to the pending litigation.

When Gaudett was hired as chief of police in 2010, his contract and police pension plan required him to file for retirement and resign from the police union, according to the decision. His contract for chief of police was set for five years, and he retired in March 2016.

The commissioner concluded that the plaintiff's "acceptance and appointment to the position of chief of police was a distinct and separate position from his prior employment with the Bridgeport Police Department."

The board agreed, and stated that the position of police chief was not an internal promotion, and the plaintiff "received his full retirement benefits at the time of his 2010 retirement."

However, the appellate court found the board and commissioner's arguments "inaccurate."

"In other words, although the plaintiff filed for and received retirement benefits when he vacated the position of deputy chief, he continued in his employ with the Bridgeport Police Department after December 20, 2010, only as the chief of police," the decision said. "Because the chief of police position is a nonunion position, the plaintiff would not be covered under the collective bargaining agreement or enrolled in the union pension plan, once he became the chief of police."

The appellate court stated that the plaintiff's retirement in 2010 did not mean he stopped being a "regular member of the Bridgeport Police Department."

"There simply was no period of time from the plaintiff's hire in 1983 until his retirement in 2016 at which the plaintiff was not a regular member of the Bridgeport Police Department," the decision said. "The commissioner improperly failed to consider this material and undisputed fact. We conclude that the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff's acceptance of the chief of police position triggered a new date of hire is an unreasonable inference to draw from the evidence."

The appellate court went further, and stated that the commissioner's conclusion was an "erroneous interpretation of § 7-433c."

"Contrary to the commissioner's reasoning, § 7-433c does not make any distinction between claimants who are receiving pension benefits and those who are not," the decision said. "The plain and unambiguous language of § 7-433c applies to any regular member of the police department, without limitation or qualification."

The appellate court reversed the decision of the board, and it remanded the case to the board to reverse the commissioner's decision.

"We disagree with the commissioner's determination that the plaintiff 'began employment' with the Bridgeport Police Department when he became the chief of police in 2010," the decision said. "Accordingly, we conclude that the board erred in affirming the commissioner's decision that the plaintiff was not eligible for benefits pursuant to § 7-433c."