TW: Suicide, teen death
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has determined the application of the state's amended PTSD presumption statute when medical experts on opposing sides offer competing opinions. The case is Juntunen v. Carlton County, 2022 Minn. LEXIS 554 (Minn. 2022).
Douglas Juntunen began his tenure as a deputy sheriff in 2001, where he had a front-row seat to tragic events; two particular moments stood out. The first was a fatal car accident involving a teenage boy who, like Juntunen's son, had recently passed his driving test. When Juntunen saw the boy's head crushed against the steering wheel, all he could think about was how it could have been his son who died in a wreck. In the second event, Juntunen and his partner, in separate squad cars, were pursuing a suspect driving a truck; Juntunen actually knew the suspect and was on friendly terms with him prior to the chase. After the suspect stopped his truck, he emerged with a gun. Juntunen was speaking to the suspect when he said to Juntunen "Tell my kids that I love them" and immediately shot himself; later at the scene, a medical examiner directly blamed Juntunen and his partner for the man's death. A few years later, one of Juntunen's former colleagues committed suicide mere days after Juntunen had helped the colleague move to Ohio.
In August 2019, Juntunen visited a licensed psychologist, Dr. Keller, who administered multiple psychological tests and ultimately diagnosed Juntunen with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Juntunen informed his supervisors, and he was immediately placed on leave. The County "denied primary liability for Juntunen's injury" until he had an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychologist chosen by the County. Juntunen challenged the County's denial of liability after he resigned from the police in February 2020. The County again denied liability but stated it was still investigating the matter. Juntunen underwent an IME in July 2020 with Dr. Arbisi, who diagnosed a major depressive disorder, but not PTSD. Dr. Arbisi claimed "active avoidance" was a hallmark symptom of PTSD, and Juntunen "[did] not avoid contact with other law enforcement officers and…[did] not report any hesitancy to discuss incidents that have occurred over his career." (internal quotes omitted). Dr. Arbisi did not address Dr. Keller's report.
The matter came before a workers compensation judge (WCJ) who compared the expert opinions before concluding, based on Dr. Arbisi's report, that "Juntunen's symptoms best fit a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, rather than PTSD" (internal quotes omitted). Juntunen appealed, and the Workers Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed the WCJ and remanded the case because Juntunen had a PTSD diagnosis from Dr. Keller, as required by the amended statute, and the results of the County-ordered IME were not sufficient to rebut the presumption.
The major question before the Supreme Court of Minnesota was whether the statutory presumption applied at the time of the employee's diagnosis or only after legal proof of the diagnosis. The presumption had three criteria: first, the employee had to be working in one of the listed professions; second, the employee must be diagnosed with PTSD by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist; and third, the employee cannot have been previously diagnosed with PTSD. The first and third points were not at issue; Juntunen had been a deputy since 2001, and he had not been diagnosed with PTSD before he was hired by the County.
The heart of the issue was whether the opinion of the employer's medical expert could overcome a diagnosis from the plaintiff's medical expert. In a prior case, Smith v. Carver County, 931 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. 2019), the Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed a case that also centered on competing mental impairment diagnosis. A WCJ found one opinion more persuasive than the other and denied; the WCCA reversed, holding that a WCJ should make an independent review of the opinions to verify their conformity to the diagnostic criteria. The Court reversed, stating that "the job of the compensation judge is to determine whether the expert diagnoses have adequate foundation and, if both have adequate foundation, decide which…is more credible and persuasive." (Smith at 396).
The compensation judge had ruled against Juntunen because he understood the presumption as requiring a legally proven diagnosis in order to be awarded benefits based on Smith. The justices noted that the amended presumption had not been effective at the time the employee in Smith was diagnosed with PTSD. Since Juntunen was diagnosed with PTSD after the amendment became effective, his diagnosis was subject to the presumption. Dr. Arbisi's opinion was insufficient to overcome the presumption for two reasons: he had not taken issue with the validity of Dr. Keller's evaluation of Juntunen, and he had not addressed Juntunen's PTSD at the time it was diagnosed. The Supreme Court of Minnesota found the County had not rebutted Juntunen's diagnosis and affirmed the WCCA decision.
Editor's Note: In most cases, employees claiming workers compensation for a mental impairment must jump through several hoops to connect their mental impairment with their job. However, many states have codified presumptions that certain employees–typically emergency responders and law enforcement personnel–are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that their mental impairment is work-related. After a qualifying employee is diagnosed with a mental impairment by a licensed mental health professional, it falls to the employer to show otherwise.
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