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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that the lower court properly granted summary judgment on claims of negligent security because a Florida statute barred recovery for negligence due to the plaintiff being in the process of committing a felony at the time of the injury. The case is Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 22-10659, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 35145 (11th Cir. Dec. 20, 2022).
Around midnight on November 17, 2018, George Beasley was shot in the head in a bank parking lot in Florida. He survived the gunshot and filed a premises-liability lawsuit against the bank, Wells Fargo, and the premises owner for negligent security. Beasley had parked his car in the drive-through lane of the bank and walked to a bar across the street. About 30 minutes later, Beasley returned to his vehicle. As he did so, he was shot in the head by a man later identified as Andraus Lee.
An off-duty police officer was working security at the bar across the street and heard the gunshot. He notified dispatch before pursuing the shooter. Officers arrived on the scene and began performing lifesaving aid to Beasley. As they worked to save Beasley, a firefighter pointed out to an officer that Beasley, a convicted felon, had a firearm in his pocket. The officer retrieved the gun, found it loaded, and secured it in the trunk of her car. Baggies of suspected marijuana and cocaine were also collected from where Beasley had been located on the ground, but the crime scene technician found "no physical evidence" at the scene to connect Beasley to the gun or the drugs.
Beasley, with no recollection of the events, maintains that the evidence fails to establish that he knowingly possessed the gun or drugs and suggests that these items could have been planted by bystanders before officers arrived at the scene. Two eyewitness statements arguably support this assertion, but a police sergeant testified that, based on her observations at the scene, there was no reason to believe anyone had moved Beasley or planted a gun on him before officers arrived.
Wells Fargo had posted signs in the area where Beasley parked his car, stating "drive-up services Wells Fargo account holders only," and "parking for Wells Fargo customers only." Beasley was not a Wells Fargo customer or account holder, nevertheless, the parking lot was frequently used as additional parking for nearby bars and restaurants. The bank did nothing to discourage such parking, and an ATM was on the property and available for public use 24 hours a day.
After the shooting, Beasley filed a premises-liability action for negligent lighting and security in the parking lot, and alleged that Wells Fargo was liable for his injuries because, when the shooting happened, the parking lot was managed and controlled by Wells Fargo.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo for two reasons unrelated to ownership and control of the premises. Florida Statute § 768.075 statutorily bars Beasley's claims because "uncontroverted evidence" established that he was in the midst of committing a felony on the property at the time of his injury – namely, possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. The district court then determined that even if the affirmative defense above did not apply, Beasley was still at best an "uninvited licensee," not an "invitee" because he used the bank parking lot for his own convenience to visit the bar across the street. The evidence failed to show that Wells Fargo breached the duty of care owed to an uninvited licensee.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding that Beasley's negligence claims were barred by the felony defense in Florida Statute § 768.075. According to that statute, a property owner "shall not be held liable for negligence that results in the death of, injury to, or damage to a person who is attempting to commit a felony or who is engaged in the commission of a felony on the property." As established in previous case law, no "causal nexus" is required between the felony and the injury. The court found Beasley's attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact about his possession of the gun to be "unavailing." The court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that even if the felony defense did not apply, the negligence claims failed on the merits because he was, at best, an uninvited licensee.
Editor's Note: According to previous cases heard by the court, namely Kuria v. BMLRW, LLLP, 101 So. 3d 425, 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), "[t]he plain language of the statute bars recovery for any person who commits a felony on the property, not just a person whose injury arises out of the commission of a felony." Since Beasley was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and Florida law prohibits felons from possessing loaded firearms, Beasley was in violation of § 768.075.