Titus was sentenced to 10 to 15 years' imprisonment.

Stacy Linklater pleaded no contest to operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death, MCL 257.625(4). Linklater was driving a vehicle after consuming several beers at a restaurant. Her southbound car crossed the center line of the road and struck head on a northbound vehicle. The northbound vehicle was occupied by 19-year-old Jared Baragwanath and 19-year-old Jocelyn Preville.

Jared Baragwanath "received critical injuries from the accident" and died two days later "due to hypoxic brain injury and multiple blunt force traumas" received in the accident.

Jocelyn Preville was taken to a nearby hospital for a closed head injury and contusions all over her body. She was released from the hospital after several days but still suffered residual effects from the collision.

A laboratory analysis of Linklater's blood taken shortly after the accident revealed that she had a blood alcohol content of .179 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. In addition, THC, the chemical constituent of marijuana, was found in her blood stream.

Linklater was sentenced to 10 to 15 years' imprisonment.

The two defendants were sentenced on separate dates by the same trial court judge.

At Titus' sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from several of the injured victims; they expressed continued emotional distress and physical effects from the accident, as well as economic loss. Titus expressed remorse for his actions.

At Linklater's sentencing, the trial court heard from Ms. Preville, who expressed grief over the loss of her close friend Jared Baragwanath. The trial court also heard from Jared Baragwanath's father who explained the emotional distress to the family since his death.

Linklater apologized to the victims and their families and expressed remorse for her conduct. The court also reviewed 15 letters submitted in support of Linklater's remorse, character, and integrity.

The scoring of each defendant's sentencing guidelines produced a recommended minimum sentence range of 29 to 57 months. Neither defendant had a prior criminal history.

In both cases, the trial court departed from the recommended minimum sentence range of 29 to 57 months and imposed a maximum sentence of 10 to 15 years' imprisonment.

The trial court explained its decision to sentence Titus as follows:

The court cannot ignore that the Michigan Legislature has sent a strong [signal] of its view of the seriousness of the offense by causing death by reckless driving by providing a maximum sentence of 15 years for imprisonment. In the circumstances the court must give effectivity to the intent of the mood of the Michigan Legislature expressed through legislation. . . .

By definition [this crime] is one which always gives rise to the extremely serious harm, the death of a victim. . . . On the other hand an offender of reckless driving did not intend to cause a death and serious injuries to other . . . even in this extreme case where the defendant was distracted by [deliberately] viewing his newsfeed on Facebook. The fact that someone died and others were seriously injured is relevant to the sentence. . . .

[T]he defendant not only caused the death but serious injuries to others. The defendant in this case knowingly put more than one person at risk and the occurrence was reasonably foreseeable. In this case the death and serious injuries to other is an aggravating factor.

Also the defendant was viewing his Facebook and not paying attention to his driving aggravates the seriousness of this offense. The defendant's proper course of action was to not view his Facebook while driving. . . .

The significant aggravating circumstances contributing to the acts in the present case is a fact the defendant, by his own admission, was driving while looking at his newsfeed on Facebook in total disregard of his driving responsibility.

The trial court provided the following reasons for imposing a maximum sentence of 10 to 15 years for Linklater:

It has been represented to the court by [Linklater's attorney] that Defendant Stacy Linklater is of good character and indeed the presentencing report has not identified anything to the contrary.

Section 257.625[(4)], so far as relevant, reads as follows. A person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated causing death is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment by not more than fifteen years or a fine of [not] less than $2,500.00 or more than $10,000.00 or both.

The court cannot ignore that the Michigan Legislature has sent a strong signal of its view of the seriousness of the offense of causing death by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated by providing for a maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment. In the circumstances the court must give efficacy to the intent of the mood of the Michigan Legislature expressed through legislation.

I would opine that unless good reason or special circumstances exists an offender convicted of causing death by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated must expect a custodial sentence upon conviction. This offense causes particular difficulty, causes particular difficulty for sentencer.

By definition it is one which always gives rise to the extremely seriousness of the harm, the death of a victim. Understandably, this often leads to calls from the family of the victim and from the wider community for tough sentencing.

On the other hand, an offender of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated did not intend to cause a death and serious injury to other; but even though the defendant may not have intended to cause a death or serious injury it must be noticed that a result of persons operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death.

Two hundred and fifty thousand people have died in alcohol related incidents in the last ten years. In other words, approximately twenty five thousand people die annually in alcohol related events. Every fifty three minutes someone is killed by a drunk driver and this is an extremely preventable crime. You don't drink and drive.

The fact that a person died and another was seriously injured is relevant to the sentence. But the primary consideration must always be to the culpability of the offender.

Three points deserve particular attention. First, the defendant not only caused death but serious injury to another. The defendant in this case knowingly put the decedent and his passenger at risk by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in excess of twice the legal limit. As such the occurrence was reasonably foreseeable.

In this case, the death and serious injury to another is an aggravating factor. Also the fact that the defendant was operating a vehicle with THC in her blood aggravates the seriousness of this offense. The material and foreseeable consequences of the defendant's actions are dangerous to life and the defendant acted with conscious disregard for these dangers. Road fatalities must be treated with enhanced seriousness by the court. . . .

Taking all of these matters as I've stated into consideration towards sentencing the court considers this case to be fit . . . for the maximum sentence the court can impose by statute which in this case is ten years.

Therefore it is the order and disposition of this court Ms. Linklater that you be sentenced to the term, to the Michigan Department of Corrections for a period of ten years to fifteen years with credit for eleven days served. . . .

First and foremost Ms. Linklater this sentence is punitive in nature. It is for the protection of society. It's to serve as a deterrent effect and I hope it has that effect. And it's to allow you the opportunity to rehabilitate yourself in the Michigan Department of Corrections and I hope you take advantage of those opportunities.

Both defendants argued on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by departing from the sentencing guidelines recommended minimum sentence range and imposing sentences that were unreasonable and disproportionate.

The Appellate Court's Decision

The appellate court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing.

In its decision, the appellate court explained that, although Michigan's sentencing guidelines were only advisory, a trial court still must "determine the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence." Moreover, the appellate court continued, a sentence that departed from the applicable guidelines range "will be reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness." It added that "the proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness" was whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the "principle of proportionality," which required sentences imposed by the trial court "to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender."

The appellate court observed that a person guilty of reckless driving causing death was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years in prison, and that a person who operated a vehicle while intoxicated and caused the death of another person similarly was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. It added that Michigan law also provided that "[t]he court shall not impose a minimum sentence, including a departure, that exceeds 2/3 of the statutory maximum sentence." Thus, the appellate court noted, both defendants were subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years, and each received a 10-year minimum sentence, the highest minimum sentence that a court could impose.

The appellate court then considered Titus' sentence, observing that:

- Titus had conceded that his crime was serious: a victim died;

- Titus had received 80 total offense variable ("OV") points, more than the 75 points necessary to place him in the highest level of offense severity for a Class C felony, indicating that this was "a serious manifestation of that offense";

- Titus had admitted crashing into several vehicles;

- The drivers of the other vehicles could do nothing to avoid a collision because they were waiting in line at a toll booth;

- The accident had caused several victims to suffer extremely severe injuries just short of death; and

- The trial court had cited the death of a victim and serious injuries to other victims as aggravating circumstances that required a departure from the guidelines.

The appellate court ruled that "the death of a victim" was not itself an aggravating circumstance." Rather, the appellate court said, it was an "element of the offense of reckless driving causing death." The appellate court added that although Titus also had caused serious injuries to other victims, the guidelines "sufficiently accounted for that in the scoring of OVs 3 and 9."

It then noted that Titus had raised no objection to a score of 25 points for OV 3, which was what MCL 777.33(1)(c) prescribed where the offender caused a victim to suffer from a "life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury." Moreover, the appellate court said, Titus had not objected to the 25 points he had been assessed under OV 9, which MCL 777.39(1)(b) prescribed where "there were 10 or more victims who were placed in danger of physical injury or death, or 20 or more victims who were placed in danger of property loss."

The appellate court, however, found that the trial court had erred when it stated that another aggravating circumstance was that Titus "was driving while looking at his newsfeed on Facebook in total disregard of his driving responsibility" because operating a vehicle with great disregard for the safety of other persons or property was "an element of the offense." Titus also should not have been assessed 10 points under OV 17, according to the appellate court, because Titus' recklessness had been taken into account by the guidelines and it "should not be considered aggravating factors for purposes of imposing an upward departure sentence."

Regarding Titus, the appellate court concluded that even if some departure from the guidelines range were justified, the trial court had to explain why the sentence imposed was "more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have been." In the appellate court's opinion, "the trial court articulated the reasons for the sentence imposed, but it failed to connect those reasons to the extent of the chosen departure," and it concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by imposing the maximum authorized sentence in excess of the guidelines recommendation "without adequate justification." It then vacated Titus' sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Next, the appellate court considered Linklater's sentence.

It noted that Linklater had been convicted of violating MCL 257.625, which made delineations based on the harm that ensued from the offense. Subsection (4) authorized heightened punishment when drunk driving caused the death of a victim, with the maximum sentence for such an offense being 15 years. MCL 257.625(4)(a).

In contrast, the appellate court said, subsection (5) stated that if the drunken driving caused serious impairment to a victim, then the maximum punishment would be five years. MCL 257.625(5)(a).

The appellate court then said that, by causing the death of another person, Linklater became subject to the higher penalty.

The appellate court stated, however, that the legislature did not contemplate or intend that "a maximum sentence of 10 to 15 years' imprisonment be imposed in every such situation." It was incumbent on the trial court to determine an appropriate minimum sentence by applying the principle of "proportionality."

According to the appellate court, the trial court appropriately labeled as "serious" conduct involving driving while intoxicated and causing the death of another person, but it ignored that these two factors, in addition to being elements of the offense of which Linklater was convicted, also were accounted for in the sentencing guidelines.

The appellate court pointed out that:

- Linklater had received a 50-point score for OV 3 specifically because a victim had been killed and death had resulted from the commission of a crime that involved the operation of a vehicle while the offender was under the influence of alcohol;

- Linklater had been assessed 15 points for OV 18, which was the appropriate score when an offender operated a vehicle "when his or her bodily alcohol content was 0.15 grams or more but less than 0.20 grams per 100 milliliters of blood"; and

- Together, the scoring of OVs 3 and 18 accounted for the fact that Linklater had been operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.179 and had caused the death of another person.

The appellate court ruled that, because these factors had been accounted for in the scoring of the statutory OVs, which were intended to account for the seriousness of an offense, "it was improper for the court to rely on these same factors a second time as denoting the 'mood' of the [l]egislature and to justify a departure sentence of more than twice the high end of the sentencing guidelines range."

Then, the appellate court noted that the trial court also had cited as aggravating factors the fact that Linklater's conduct had caused injuries to another person and that she also had THC in her system, but the appellate court said that these factors did "not appear to be accounted for in the scoring of the guidelines." The appelalte court added that there was "no information indicating how long the THC had been in" Linklater's system, "or what effect, if any, it had on her driving." According to the appellate court:

To the extent that these factors may support some departure from the sentencing guidelines range, we cannot conclude that they justify a maximum sentence that is more than double the high end of the sentencing guidelines range.

The appellate court then pointed out that Linklater had no prior convictions of any kind or any alcohol-related arrests; that she had showed "remorse at sentencing"; and that she had taken responsibility for her actions by pleading no contest to the charge without any bargain for sentencing leniency. The appellate court added that the trial court had reviewed 15 letters submitted in support of Linklater's "remorse, character, and integrity" and that the trial court had acknowledged at sentencing that there was no evidence to refute Linklater's "good character."

The trial court "focused solely on the circumstances of the offense to justify imposing the maximum sentence allowed," according to the appellate court. It concluded that the trial court's imposition of a "maximum sentence" on Linklater, "a first-time offender who had expressed remorse for her conduct and had significant community support," left "no room for the principle of proportionality to operate against more serious offenders who, for example, have shown a propensity to drink and drive again."

Her sentence of 10 to 15 years' imprisonment was "disproportionate and, in turn, unreasonable," the appellate court held, and it vacated her sentence and remanded for resentencing.

(The appellate court rejected Linklater's argument that a different judge should undertake her resentencing because of the "high emotions" of the case.)

The case is People v. Titus, Nos. 336352, 337177 (Mich. Ct.App. Feb. 15, 2018).