Ms. Medina planned to keep the Suzuki in the driveway until her son was old enough to drive. She permitted Mr. Montoya to drive the Suzuki when his Passat was inoperable.

On April 19, 2014, Mr. Montoya noticed mechanical problems with his Passat and had it towed to a repair shop. According to Mr. Montoya, three days later, while his Passat was at the shop, he got Ms. Medina's permission to drive the Suzuki to work. En route, Mr. Montoya rear-ended the car in front of him, which hit a third car; Sheryl Lopeza allegedly was injured in the wreck.

Ms. Lopez sued Montoya for negligence in Florida court.

GEICO refused to defend or indemnify him because, according to the insurer, the "Suzuki was not a listed vehicle and does not meet the definition of non owned vehicle."

Mr. Montoya agreed to the entry of a final judgment against him for $485,000 and assigned his rights against GEICO to Ms. Lopez.

Ms. Lopez, as Mr. Montoya's assignee, filed suit against GEICO, seeking declaratory relief to determine the existence of insurance coverage and damages for breach of contract.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO, concluding that the phrase "the named insured" in the Policy was "unambiguously plural" and, therefore, that the Suzuki did not qualify as a "temporary substitute auto."

Ms. Lopez appealed.

The GEICO Policy

The Policy provided:

Temporary substitute auto means a private passenger, farm or utility auto or trailer not owned by you or your relative, temporarily used with the permission of the owner. This vehicle must be used as a substitute for the owned auto or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

The Policy defined:

you 

as:

the named insured shown in the declarations or his or her spouse if a resident of the same household. 

The circuit court, applying the substantive law of Florida, reversed the grant of summary judgment to GEICO.

In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit explained that if the term "the named insured" in the Policy was singular and referred only to Mr. Montoya, the Suzuki was not owned by "you," that is, Mr. Montoya, and could qualify as a "temporary substitute auto." If it was plural, the circuit court added, the Suzuki was owned by "you," that is, Mr. Montoya or Ms. Medina, and could not qualify as a "temporary substitute auto."

Moreover, the circuit court said, if "the named insured" was ambiguous – that is, reasonably susceptible to both a singular and plural interpretation – it had to be interpreted "liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter."

The Eleventh Circuit then ruled that the phrase "the named insured" could "reasonably be interpreted to refer to a single person." It observed that the Policy used the singular possessive pronouns "his or her" instead of the plural possessive "their" in defining "you" as "the named insured shown in the declarations or his or her spouse." (Emphasis added.)

In the circuit court's opinion, that suggested that the antecedent to which those pronouns referred, "the named insured," also was singular.

In addition, the circuit court continued, the term "the named insured" itself suggested the phrase was singular. Had the Policy meant to include both Mr. Montoya and Ms. Medina within the definition of "you," "it could have substituted the word 'any' for 'the,' specifying 'any named insured.'"

The circuit court pointed out that, in several other provisions, the policy used the word "any" to signify multiple insureds.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase "the named insured" was "ambiguous" because it could "reasonably be interpreted to refer to a single person," and the district court had erred by ruling that the Suzuki was not a "temporary substitute auto" on the basis that it was "owned by you."

The circuit court concluded by remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether the Suzuki satisfied the additional requirements to qualify as a "temporary substitute auto."

The case is Lopez v. GEICO General Ins. Co., No. 16-15551 (11th Cir. Jan. 23, 2018). Attorneys involved include: For SHERYL LOPEZ, as assignee of Timothy Montoya, Plaintiff – Appellant: Kathryn E. Lee, Kevin Britt Woods, Harmon Parker, PA, TAMPA, FL. For GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant – Appellee: Anthony John Russo, Lewis F. Collins, Jr., Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP, TAMPA, FL.