Liberty Mutual moved to implead Ordinary Joe, Inc., and the trial court granted its motion. Liberty Mutual then filed a third-party complaint against Ordinary Joe under Connecticut General Statutes §52-102a alleging wanton and reckless misconduct and that Ordinary Joe had served Mr. Crespo a large volume of alcohol for consumption and that it had known, or had consciously disregarded, that it had served him a quantity of alcohol dangerous to his health and well-being.

Liberty Mutual further alleged that Ordinary Joe had known or had consciously disregarded determining Mr. Crespo's mode of transportation upon his departure from the premises, and that it had chosen a manner of service of alcohol knowing a serious danger existed as a result thereof.

As such, Liberty Mutual claimed that Ordinary Joe was liable to it for all or part of Mr. Crespo's injuries.

Ordinary Joe moved for summary judgment as to Liberty Mutual's third party complaint. It argued that Liberty Mutual could not maintain its cause of action for wanton and reckless misconduct against it because under General Statutes Section 52-102a, Ordinary Joe's liability was not secondary to, or derivative of, Liberty Mutual's liability for UIM benefits. Accordingly, Ordinary Joe asserted that the third-party complaint was improper, and summary judgment should be granted in its favor.

Connecticut Law

General Statutes §52-102a states:

Sec. 52-102a. Impleading of third party by defendant. Rights and remedies of third-party defendant. (a) A defendant in any civil action may move the court for permission as a third-party plaintiff to serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The motion may be filed at any time before trial and permission may be granted by the court if, in its discretion, it deems that the granting of the motion will not unduly delay the trial of the action nor work an injustice upon the plaintiff or the party sought to be impleaded.

The Trial Court's Decision

The trial court granted Ordinary Joe's motion.

In its decision, the trial court explained that Section 52-102a(a) provides that a party may be impleaded if the party is "a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to [the party seeking impleader] for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." According to the trial court, the "plain language" of this provision indicated and implied that for impleader to be proper, the third-party defendant "must be liable for indemnification or contribution to the third party plaintiff for the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff."

Here, the trial court reasoned, Mr. Crespo plaintiff brought an action for UIM benefits against Liberty Mutual, his motor vehicle insurance carrier, pursuant to his motor vehicle insurance policy. That was a "contractual claim" triggered by an underlying motor vehicle accident claim alleging negligence, the trial court added.

The trial court then pointed out that Liberty Mutual's claim against Ordinary Joe was "not a claim for negligence, indemnity, or contribution" but, rather, a claim that Ordinary Joe had acted recklessly in its service of alcohol to Mr. Crespo.

The trial court found "no conceivable way" that Ordinary Joe would be liable to Liberty Mutual for any of Mr. Crespo's claims against Liberty Mutual. Indeed, it ruled, interpreting Section 52-102a to allow such a result would be "bizarre or unworkable."

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Liberty Mutual's motion to implead Ordinary Joe as a third-party defendant had been improvidently granted because Ordinary Joe had "no relationship, contractually or otherwise, to the third-party plaintiff, Liberty Mutual," and it granted Ordinary Joe's motion for summary judgment.

The case is Crespo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. UWYCV166030551S (Conn. Super.Ct. Dec. 21, 2017).