The Hursts argued that their injuries had been the result of two accidents, warranting $600,000 in coverage.

The Hursts and MetLife filed cross-motions for summary judgment, along with a stipulation of the underlying facts.

The trial court applied a legal doctrine known as the "cause theory" to conclude that only one accident had occurred and, thus, that MetLife's policy limit for UM coverage was $300,000. It granted summary judgment in favor of MetLife.

The Hursts appealed.

The MetLife Policy

The MetLife policy provided UM coverage/benefits in the amount of:

$300,000 each person/$300,000 each accident. 

The policy also provided:

"Limit of Liability"

A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each person" is the most we will pay for all damages, including prejudgment and post-judgment interest, due to BI to any one person as a result of any one accident. This includes all damages sustained by any other person as a result of that BI. Subject to this limit for "each person", the limit shown in the declarations for "each accident" is the most we will pay for all damages, including prejudgment and post-judgment interest, arising out of BI sustained by two or more persons resulting from any one accident.

If a single limit is shown in the Declarations for "each accident" this is the most we will pay for any one accident. . . .

The limit of liability includes damages for care, loss of consortium, emotional distress, and loss of services or death.

This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:

1. insureds;

2. claims made;

3. vehicles shown in the Declarations;

4. premiums shown in the Declarations; or

5. vehicles involved in the accident.

(Emphasis added.)

The Wyoming Supreme Court's Decision

The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, concluding that although the trial court had adopted the correct legal theory upon which to determine the number of accidents for application of UM coverage and policy limits, the factual record was insufficient for a legal conclusion as to whether Ms. Terry had maintained or regained control of her vehicle during her collisions with the Hursts. As a result, the court decided, summary judgment had been improperly granted.

In its decision, the court explained that courts use three theories to interpret the term "one accident" – the cause theory, the effect theory, and the event theory.

Under the cause theory, the court said, the number of accidents was determined by the number of causes of the injuries, with the court asking if there was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause that resulted in all of the injuries and damage.

There may be more than one accident under the cause theory when an intervening cause demarcated the collisions, the court observed.

Under the effect theory, the court explained, the number of accidents was considered from the perspective of the injured parties. A court applying the event theory considered the "number of events" that happened, it added.

The Wyoming Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, agreed with the trial court that the cause theory – the majority view – should be used to determine the number of accidents at issue.

The court then ruled that the trial court had erred in deciding that, pursuant to the cause theory, only one accident had occurred for purposes of interpreting the policy limits.

It reasoned that the stipulated facts revealed that the collisions with Mr. Hurst and Ms. Hurst "could be separate incidents," each arising out of Ms. Terry's "independent collision with each of the Hursts, riding his/her own, separate bicycle."

The court pointed out that the trial court "did not give much, if any, consideration to the notion of [Ms.] Terry's control of her vehicle." That was important, according to the court, because the element of control had "a significant, if not overriding, impact" on the determination of whether there had been more than one accident.

In the court's view, the stipulated facts provided no evidence that Ms. Terry:

• Had lost control of her vehicle;

• Had lost control after hitting Mr. Hurst and before hitting Ms. Hurst; or

• Had maintained or regained control of her vehicle throughout the duration.

Accordingly, the court concluded, the stipulated facts were inconclusive regarding Ms. Terry's control of her vehicle, and the matter had to be remanded for trial.

The case is Hurst v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. Co., No. S-17-0082 (Wyo. Sep. 12, 2017). Attorneys involved include: Representing Appellants: Autumn Aspen, John Coppede, Quinton Parham, and Richard D. Bush of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Bush. Representing Appellee: Megan Overmann Goetz of Pence and MacMillan, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

FC&S Legal Comment

The "cause theory" has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions that have decided the issue. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe, 614 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 2010); Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955); Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Heary, 432 F.Supp. 995 (E.D. Va. 1977); Just v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 877 N.W.2d 467 (Iowa 2016); Washington v. McCauley, 62 So.3d 173 (La. Ct.App. 2011); Bish v. Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co., 848 P.2d 1057 (Nev. 1993) (per curiam); Kan. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Koelling, 729 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct.App. 1987); Olsen v. Moore, 202 N.W.2d 236 (Wisc. 1972); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 303 P.2d 659 (Wash. 1956) (en banc); Hyer v. Inter-Ins. Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Cal., 246 P. 1055 (Cal. Ct.App. 1926).