The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that an insurer had a duty to defend a dog bite case in Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 17146, 17147, 2005 WL 1618210 ( Conn. July 19, 2005).

 

Mitch Wylie was president and sole stockholder in a dirt bike business called Strictly Dirt. While on the Strictly Dirt premises as an invitee, Samantha Bard was bitten by Wylie's dog, which he frequently brought to the shop.

 

Bard's parents sought damages against both Wylie and Strictly Dirt for the injuries caused by the dog bite. Strictly Dirt's commercial insurer, Litchfield, defended the business but not Wylie. Wylie's homeowners insurer, Hartford, defended him in the action, and then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judgment that Litchfield had a duty to defend and that Litchfield's coverage was primary and Hartford 's coverage was excess.

 

Wylie and Hartford (the plaintiffs) argued that a duty to defend is owed if there is a possibility that a complaint may be covered. Because the dog bit an invitee to Wylie's place of business, the plaintiffs contended, “there was at least the possibility that the injury occurred as a result of Wylie's business conduct.”

 

Litchfield countered that, without a connection between the dog and the premises of Strictly Dirt, it had no duty to defend Wylie. Litchfield said that “because the Bard action was based only on Wylie's personal ownership of the dog, it did not come within the coverage provided by the defendant's commercial policy,” and thus there was no duty to defend Wylie.

 

The court, however, said that “the policy language does not specify anything more than that the incident causing the damage must arise from the use of the insured's premises.” The incident took place on Strictly Dirt's premises, where Wylie and his dog were both located. Wylie was an insured, as defined under the policy.

 

Based on these findings, the court concluded that Litchfield owed Wylie a defense “because the language of the Strictly Dirt policy clearly covers Wylie in his capacity as an employee, and the complaint in the underlying action creates at least the possibility that Wylie was sued in his insured capacity.”