Injuries From High-speed Chase Not Excluded as Intentional
In Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1028048 (Tex.,2009), the Supreme Court of Texas examined asked whether an insured's attempts to elude police in a high-speed chase forfeited coverage under the intentional injury exclusion in his automobile liability insurance policy.
Richard Gibbons was driving his pickup truck when he was pulled over by a state trooper. Gibbons initially stopped but then fled, with the trooper in hot pursuit chasing him. A high-speed police chase ensued, resulting in a traffic accident which sparked a personal injury lawsuit against the Gibbons by the Tanners, who were injured in the crash.
The Tanners sued Gibbons and obtained a default judgment. Gibbons' insurer, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, refused to pay damages, arguing the intentional injury exclusion barred coverage for the Tanners' claims. The jury disagreed, finding that Gibbons did not intentionally cause the Tanners' injuries. The trial court granted Nationwide's motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, stating that “as a matter of law, the intentional acts exclusion in Gibbons' liability policy excluded any coverage for the Tanners' claims.”
Nationwide contended that when Gibbons fled police, he voided coverage under the policy's intentional injury exclusion, which withheld coverage for property damage or bodily injury caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured, including willful acts the result of which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the insured's conduct.
The Texas high court disagreed, explaining that the evidence at trial did not indicate, as the jury charge put it, that “the property damage or bodily injury to the Tanners was caused intentionally,” much less indicate such intent as a matter of law.
According to the court, Gibbons slammed on his brakes hard enough to skid before impact, showing he actively tried to avoid the collision.
In addition, the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that Gibbons believed his conduct was substantially certain to injure the Tanners. The court explained that although leading police on a protracted high-speed chase was not merely reckless but also reprehensible, it could not say that no reasonable juror could resist finding that injury to others was unavoidable, as the chase could have ended in any number of other ways.
Nationwide's policy exclusion also had additional language excluding coverage for “willful acts the result of which the insured knows or ought to know will follow.” Because this passage also focused on whether the insured intended the injurious result, the court found this language reinforced the view that the dispositive inquiry was whether the insured intended to inflict damage or injury. To forfeit coverage, the insured must intend to harm, not merely intend to act, the court said.
Finally, the court examined the part of Nationwide's exclusion that denies coverage if the insured “ought to know” that injury will result. The court noted that this language might be read as stating an alternative objective test, excluding coverage not only where the insured subjectively knew that injury would follow, but also where a reasonable person would know that injury would follow.
However, the court concluded that this objective ground for denying coverage did not alter the unequivocal “will follow” language that completed the sentence. Thus, under the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable and fair-minded jury would not be compelled to find, under an objective standard, that a reasonable person would know that injury to third parties would result from Gibbons' conduct.
Thus, because Nationwide did not establish as a matter of law that Gibbons intentionally caused the Tanners' injuries, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment.