Husband's Shooting of Spouse's Stalker Intentional
In Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle, 2008 WL 2065230 (Ky.App.), the Kentucky Court of Appeals examined the question of whether there was liability coverage for an incident in which the insured's husband shot her alleged stalker.
The couple, Coyle and Tweed, had been living at a residence owned by Tweed and insured under Tweed's policy issued by Farm Bureau. According to Coyle, Tweed's co-worker, Elliott, had become attracted to Tweed and had attempted to date her. After Tweed rebuffed his advances, Elliot began harassing her and Coyle. The harassment was ongoing for about a year and included stalking, vandalizing Tweed's property, and writing obscene messages about her on traffic signs.
When Tweed and Coyle noticed Elliott driving by their residence, Coyle grabbed a pistol and pursued Elliott. When Coyle caught up with him, he pulled his vehicle in front of Elliott's vehicle, blocking it. Coyle exited his vehicle and walked toward Elliott's vehicle to confront him. Elliott sped away and Coyle fired two shots at his vehicle. At least one of the shots struck Elliott's vehicle. Coyle then reentered his vehicle and resumed his pursuit.
He continued chasing Elliott until Elliot pulled into a parking lot with Coyle close behind. Elliott slid into a fence and his car came to a stop. Coyle pulled in behind Elliott, exited his vehicle, and approached Elliot's vehicle. Elliott lowered the drivers' side window and Coyle walked around to the side of the vehicle, thinking Elliott was going to talk to him. As Coyle approached, however, Elliott again attempted to flee. Coyle then fired two shots through the open window and struck Elliott in the shoulder, the bullet puncturing and collapsing his lung.
Elliott filed a complaint against Coyle alleging the intentional torts of assault and battery and seeking punitive damages. Coyle denied liability and filed a counterclaim alleging harassment, stalking, and outrageous conduct.
Farm Bureau filed an intervening petition for a declaration of rights seeking a declaratory judgment that Tweed's policy did not cover the events and that it had no liability under the policy. The policy's liability coverage extended only to an “occurrence,” and an occurrence is defined in the policy as an “accident.” Further, the policy had an exclusion to liability coverage which provided that the coverage did not apply to bodily injury or property damage “[w]hich is expected or intended by one or more 'insureds'.”
The trial court granted Elliott's motion to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint abandoned Elliott's intentional assault and battery claims and, instead, grounded his claims against Coyle upon a negligence theory. The amended complaint stated that Coyle negligently discharged a weapon at Elliot's vehicle, striking Elliot, and that Coyle breached his duty to use his handgun in a way that avoided injuries to Elliot. The amended complaint thus brought Elliott's claims within the scope of Tweed's policy.
The jury determined Coyle's shooting of Elliott to be an “accident” which was “merely negligent and unintended.” The trial court then entered final judgment adjudging that, because the shooting was an accident, Tweed's Farm Bureau policy did not preclude coverage of Coyle, and denied Farm Bureau's petition for a declaration of noncoverage.
The court then denied Farm Bureau's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or a new trial, and Farm Bureau appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded the decision, holding that pursuant to the inferred intent doctrine, the policy did not provide coverage for damages resulting from the shooting.
According to the court, under the inferred intent doctrine the insured's conduct of intentionally aiming the firearm at the injured party and intending to discharge the bullet at him was intentional and of such a nature that harm inhered in it. Thus, the policy providing coverage for “accidents” caused by an insured, and excluding coverage for injury or damage which was expected or intended by an insured, did not provide coverage for damages resulting from the shooting. Even if the insured did not intend to cause harm by his conduct, the insured intentionally and deliberately discharged a bullet at the injured party, intending to shoot at the car occupied by Elliot.
The court explained that under the “inferred intent rule,” where the insured's conduct is both intentional and of such a nature and character that harm inheres in it, conduct affords a sufficiently clear demonstration of intent to harm subsuming any need for a separate inquiry into capacity. Further, once it is determined, strictly by examining the nature and character of the act in question, it is appropriate to apply the inferred intent rule so as to exclude liability coverage for harm intended by an insured; the actor's actual subjective intent to harm or capacity to form that intent becomes irrelevant.