In American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. As One, Inc., No. 26906, 2006 WL 1062910 (Mo. App. S.D. Apr. 24, 2006), a Missouri appeals court found that the word “furnished,” as a matter of law, does not mandate that a third party supply a worker to an insured.

 

James Stepp was injured while using a bucket truck on the job, working with As One. As One did not carry workers compensation insurance; it was insured under a business auto policy with American Family.

 

The business auto policy excluded “'bodily injury' to an 'employee' of the 'insured' arising out of and in the course of…[e]mployment by the 'insured'; or…[p]erforming the duties related to the conduct of the 'insured's' business.” Leased workers, defined as “persons leased to you by a labor[-]leasing firm, to perform duties related to the conduct of your business,” were included in the definition of “employee.” Temporary workers, however, were not included. A “temporary worker” was defined as “a person who is furnished to you for a finite time period to support or supplement your workforce in special work situations such as 'employee' absences, temporary skill shortages and seasonal workloads.”

 

The lower court granted American Family's motion for summary judgment and found that Stepp was excluded from coverage. As One appealed.

 

As One asserted that Stepp was a temporary employee, and thus covered by the policy. American Family argued, though, that “there was no evidence to demonstrate how [Stepp] was 'furnished' under the policy definition of 'temporary worker.'”

 

The court noted that “furnished” was not defined in the policy. It turned to Webster's for a definition: “To provide or supply with what is needed, useful or desirable.” The court said that, in regards to a worker, nothing requires that the worker be supplied by someone else—he furnishes himself for work. The court said, “There simply is no requirement in the word 'furnish,' or in the policy, that indicates a third party must furnish the specific worker.”

 

The court therefore found that issues of material fact existed and that summary judgment was improper.