In Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pelgen, 2007 WL 1804319 (Ky.App., 2007), the issue for the Kentucky Court of Appeals was whether the circuit court erred in failing to apply the inferred intent rule to an insured who killed his wife at a time when it is alleged that he lacked the mental capacity to form intent.

 

The case involved insured Charles R. Swope, who fatally shot his wife, Cloay, and then shot and killed himself. For some time prior to the incident, Cloay had moved out, and apparently the couple's marriage was floundering. Cloay was outside at Charles' residence, the former marital home, when Charles retrieved a shotgun and shot Cloay twice, while she held their three-year-old daughter. He then went inside and shot himself.

 

According to the court, the record showed that for several years preceding the event, Charles suffered from mental illness manifesting itself in psychosis, delusions, auditory hallucinations and suicidal thoughts, and that his mental condition probably deteriorated further during the four to six months preceding the shootings.

 

The administratrix of Charles's estate sought personal liability coverage under a Nationwide homeowners policy. Nationwide denied coverage in part under the policy's stated exclusion for bodily injury “caused intentionally by . . . an insured, including willful acts the result of which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the insured's conduct.”

 

The circuit court held that Nationwide could not rely on the policy exclusion to deny coverage for the harm resulting from Swope's acts, because Swope lacked the capacity to understand the physical nature of the consequences of his actions and could not form any intent. The court of appeals disagreed, and it reversed and remanded.

The court of appeals began by explaining that under Kentucky precedent, certain actions by the insured give rise to an “inferred intent,” regardless of the actor's actual intent, so as to preclude coverage. The court discussed the inferred intent rule, concluding that the inferred intent rule “is supported by sound public policy principles, in part because it removes from the trial court the burden of determining an actor's thought process when engaging in conduct resulting in harm. That is to say, in certain circumstances one may reasonably infer from the facts that the actor intended the harm, without needing to resort to proof of that intent.”

 

The court also pointed out that Swope's actions, although perhaps excusable due to his mental state, were still intentional ones, as he deliberately pointed a gun at his wife's face, pulled the trigger, avoided shooting his child in his wife's arms, and then shot himself.

 

While the court expressed sympathy for the Swope family, it did not believe Nationwide “contracted to provide coverage in instances like the one at bar.” Therefore, the inferred intent rule applied, and the exclusion barred coverage.