In Wu Chen v. Bernadel, 2007 WL 1628413 (Conn. App .), Jhimy Bernadel rode with a friend, Max Desrosiers, to Connecticut from New York. Although the car was registered in Bernadel's name, Desrosiers drove. While at a toll booth in New York, Wu Chen got out of his car to inspect the car's muffler and was hit by the Bernadel's car. As a result of this incident, Wu Chen underwent several surgeries on both of his legs, and his right leg eventually was amputated above the knee.
In April, 2005, Wu Chen filed an application for a prejudgment remedy, along with an affidavit and a direction for attachment of the defendant's property, in the amount of $2.5 million. He claimed that the accident and his resulting injuries were caused by Desrosiers' negligence and that Bernadel, as the registered owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable.
On July 25, 2005, the trial court found: “Evidence indisputably established that [Bernadel] was the owner of the car…that the son had general authority to use the car for his own pleasure and convenience…[and concluded that]…the defendant…may be held liable for the alleged negligence of an operator delegated by his son to operate the family car.”
Gesner Bernadel appealed this judgment claiming that the court improperly concluded that he could be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries under the family car doctrine, codified as Connecticut General Statutes §52-182, because (1) he was not the owner of the car and exercised no control over the use of the car, and (2) the operator of the car was not a member of his family.
The law states, “Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle…was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle…was being operated as a family car…within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.”
The court stated, “[A]n appellate court is entitled to presume that the trial court acted properly and considered all the evidence.” In this case, the appeals court had to determine whether the trial court's following conclusions were reasonable: (1) Bernadel was the owner of the vehicle, (2) he maintained it as a family car, and (3) his son had general authority to give permission to a third party to operate the vehicle.
The court found that the defendant was the owner of the car. The defendant testified that the car was registered in his name but attempted to deny ownership by arguing that he cosigned the loan for the car only so that his son would have a car, that the defendant never used the car, and that his son was free to use the car as he pleased. Bernadel argued that he did not maintain any control of the vehicle, and, therefore, the family car doctrine is inapplicable to this case.
At the hearing, the defendant testified that the car was insured in his name as well as his son's. He also testified that although he cosigned the loan for the car, he never drove the car and that his son used the car as he pleased. It was also established that at the time the incident occurred the son was living in the defendant's home. In light of this information, the appellate court concluded that the trial court's finding that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle in question was not unreasonable.
The court found that Bernadel did in fact exercise a degree of control over his son's use of the car by granting his son general authority to use the vehicle as he pleased. The court noted that had it not been for the Bernadel's assistance, the son would not have been able to get the car. It was not until Bernadel granted general authority to his son that he relinquished full control over his son's use of the car, and at that time the son became an agent of the defendant. As such, any use or enjoyment the son received from the car was as an agent of the defendant. Bernadel, therefore, was liable for any injuries to third parties resulting from the negligent conduct or breach of duty by his agent, who was acting within the scope of the general authority granted to him by the defendant.
Bernadel's final claim was that the family car doctrine was not applicable because Desrosiers is not a member of the defendant's family, and that the defendant, therefore, could not be subjected to liability under the family car doctrine. The court found that Desrosiers, although not a member of the defendant's household, was authorized by a member of the defendant's household to operate the vehicle. The court concluded that Desrosiers' negligence could be considered that of the defendant's son under the family car doctrine.
Bernadel's son made the decision to delegate the responsibility of driving in New York to his friend. The father did not give his son specific limiting instructions with regard to use of the car. Bernadel may be subjected to liability for Desrosiers' negligence in driving the car because Bernadel's son had general authority to use the car for his own pleasure and convenience. As previously noted, when the trial court's findings are supported by the record, it is not the appellate court's role to duplicate its weighing process. Accordingly, the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Their judgment was affirmed.