216 A.3d 629

Supreme Court of Connecticut

March 28, 2019; October 8, 2019, Officially Released

SC 20000, SC 20001, SC 20003

333 Conn. 343 * | 216 A.3d 629 ** | 2019 Conn. LEXIS 266 ***

R.T. VANDERBILT COMPANY, INC.

v.

HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY ET AL.

Overview

HOLDINGS:

[1]-The appellate court properly interpreted the occupational disease exclusions in two excess insurance policies to exclude occupational disease claims brought against the insured by both its employees and nonemployees because the text of the occupational disease exclusions did not contain language expressly limiting their application to the employees of the insured. The appellate court, therefore, properly reversed the decision of the trial court, which had adopted a reading of the occupational disease exclusions to the contrary.

Outcome

Judgment affirmed.

Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. These certified appeals, which present us with several significant questions of insurance law, arise from coverage disputes between the plaintiff, R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. (Vanderbilt), and the defendants, who are numerous insurance companies (insurer defendants) that issued primary and secondary comprehensive general liability insurance policies to Vanderbilt between 1948 and 2008, stemming from thousands of underlying lawsuits alleging injuries from exposure to industrial talc containing asbestos that Vanderbilt mined and sold. Vanderbilt and the insurer defendants appeal, upon our granting of their petitions for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming in part and reversing in part numerous interlocutory decisions made by the trial court in connection with the first and second phases of a complex trial between the parties. R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 171 Conn. App. 61, 75-76, 156 A.3d 539 (2017). On appeal, the insurer defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly (1) upheld the trial court's adoption of a "continuous trigger" theory of coverage for asbestos related disease claims as a matter of law and the trial court's related preclusion of expert testimony on current medical science regarding the actual timing of bodily injury from such disease, (2) upheld the trial court's adoption of an "unavailability of insurance" exception to the "time on the risk" rule of contract law, which provides for pro rata allocation of defense costs and indemnity for asbestos related disease claims, and (3) interpreted pollution exclusion clauses in certain insurance policies as applicable only to claims arising from "traditional" environmental pollution, rather than to those arising from asbestos exposure in indoor working environments. In its appeal, Vanderbilt claims that the Appellate Court improperly construed occupational disease exclusions present in certain policies as not limited to claims brought by Vanderbilt's own employees. Because we conclude that the Appellate Court's comprehensive opinion properly resolved these significant issues, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court aptly sets forth the relevant background facts and procedural history. "Vanderbilt is a Connecticut corporation engaged in the mining and sale of various chemical and mineral products. In 1948, it began to produce industrial talc through its subsidiary, Gouverneur Talc Company. Vanderbilt continued to mine and sell talc until 2008, when it ceased production and sold off the last of its inventory.

"Over the past several decades, thousands of underlying actions have been filed against Vanderbilt in various jurisdictions throughout the United States, many of which remain pending. Those actions alleged that talc and silica mined and sold by Vanderbilt contained asbestos or otherwise caused diseases that are correlated to asbestos exposure, such as mesothelioma, other asbestos related cancer, and asbestosis (collectively, asbestos related disease). In response, Vanderbilt has taken the position that its industrial talc does not contain asbestos. From the time that it started mining talc, Vanderbilt purchased or attempted to purchase primary and secondary comprehensive general liability insurance to cover the defense and indemnity costs of asbestos related claims.

"Vanderbilt brought the present action against several insurance companies that issued it primary insurance policies between 1948 and 2008 . . . ." Id., 76-77; see footnote 2 of this opinion (listing defendants). In particular, Vanderbilt alleged that its primary insurers—Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and Continental Casualty Company, Columbia Casualty Company and Continental Insurance Company (collectively, Continental) "had breached their contractual obligations to pay their proper shares of defense and indemnity costs in the underlying actions. Vanderbilt also sought a declaratory judgment as to the parties' respective rights and responsibilities under the policies at issue.

"Continental subsequently filed a [third-party] complaint against various insurance companies that had provided secondary coverage—umbrella or excess—to Vanderbilt during the time that it was in the talc business." (Footnote altered.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 171 Conn. App. 77. "Vanderbilt thereafter brought direct claims against these [third-party] secondary insurers." Id., 78.

"Prior to the start of trial, the trial court issued a series of scheduling orders, pursuant to which it separated the trial into four phases. In the first two phases, which were tried to the court and have been completed, the court addressed Vanderbilt's declaratory judgment claims and related counterclaims and cross claims. The primary issue before the court in those phases was how insurance obligations are to be allocated with respect to long latency asbestos related claims alleging injuries that occur over the course of years or even decades and, therefore, potentially implicate multiple insurance policy periods. Specifically, in Phase I, the court addressed the question of how defense costs for the underlying actions were to be allocated as between Vanderbilt and its insurers. That required a determination of (1) the periods during which the defendants' insurance policies were in effect and (2) whether Vanderbilt should be treated as self-insured for any period so as to create an equitable obligation to contribute to the costs of its defense. In Phase II, the court considered the same questions with respect to indemnity costs. In that phase, the court also issued rulings with respect to the meaning of various policy provisions, the exhaustion of Vanderbilt's primary policies, and related issues. In Phase III of the trial, which also will be tried to the court, the court plans to adjudicate the defendants' claims for recovery of overpayment of insurance costs. In Phase IV, Vanderbilt's breach of contract claims against its insurers are to be tried to a jury." (Footnote altered.) Id., 78-79.

"In addressing the allocation questions in Phases I and II, the trial court proceeded on the assumption that Connecticut follows a pro rata, [time on the risk] approach to allocating insurance obligations in longtail cases. See footnote [6] of this opinion. Under that allocation scheme, the court assumed that a victim of asbestos related disease suffers continuous injuries commencing at the time of initial exposure to asbestos and extending until disease manifests and, therefore, that defense and indemnity costs must be allocated across all of the insurance policies on the risk (i.e., potentially liable) during that period (allocation block). The court further assumed that (1) the policyholder is responsible for a pro rata share of costs for any period during which it is uninsured or underinsured (proration to the insured), including so-called 'orphan share' periods covered by policies that were lost, destroyed, or issued by insurers that subsequently became insolvent; but (2) Connecticut has embraced an unavailability of insurance exception pursuant to which there is no proration to the insured for periods during which insurance is not available. Applying these principles to the present case, the court held evidentiary hearings during Phases I and II to determine, among other things, whether defense and indemnity insurance coverage, respectively, was available for asbestos related claims between 1948 and 2008 and, if so, whether Vanderbilt availed itself of such coverage." Id., 79-80.

On the basis of findings of fact rendered after Phase I, the trial court "determined that the allocation of defense and indemnity costs would be applied prospectively in the following manner, on the basis of a total potential exposure period of [732] months running from 1948 through 2008: (1) as to defense costs, Vanderbilt would be liable for 265 of the [732] months; (2) as to indemnity costs, Vanderbilt would be liable for [96] of the [732] months; and (3) Vanderbilt's responsibility as to both defense and indemnity costs would be adjusted upward for any additional periods when there was a gap in coverage or an insolvent insurer. The court applied these same findings, principles, and allocation rules to underlying actions that alleged harms arising from nonasbestos particulates such as silica. Specifically, the court credited testimony that all of the underlying actions, whether on their face or through subsequent discovery or investigation, involved claims of exposure to asbestos.

*355] "In its Phase II decision, the court also considered the applicability of two types of exclusions contained in certain of Vanderbilt's excess and umbrella policies. The court first addressed the claim by several secondary insurers that the pollution exclusion clauses contained in their policies barred coverage for the underlying actions. The court concluded that the relevant policy language was ambiguous as applied to the asbestos related claims and, therefore, that the exclusions did not preclude coverage. The court also addressed the issue of whether occupational disease exclusions contained in certain secondary policies applied only to claims brought by the policyholder's own employees. The court found that the exclusions were unambiguous and that they did, in fact, bar coverage only for claims brought by Vanderbilt's own employees." (Footnote altered.) Id., 82-83.

"Following the completion of the Phase II trial, Vanderbilt and several defendants filed appeals and cross appeals [with the Appellate Court], challenging approximately twenty of the court's conclusions and findings." Id., 83. The Appellate Court subsequently issued an opinion of extraordinary complexity and comprehensiveness addressing a plethora of issues. With respect to the issues now before us in this certified appeal, the Appellate Court first concluded that the trial court properly adopted a "continuous trigger" theory of coverage for asbestos related disease claims as a matter of law and, accordingly, properly precluded the admission of expert testimony on current medical science regarding the actual timing of bodily injury from such disease. Id., 118-19. The Appellate Court further upheld the trial court's adoption of an "unavailability of insurance" exception to the "time on the risk" rule of contract law, which provides for the pro rata allocation of defense costs and indemnity for asbestos related disease claims. Id., 143. The Appellate Court then interpreted the pollution exclusion clauses as applicable only to claims arising from "traditional environmental pollution," rather than those arising from asbestos exposure in indoor working environments. Id., 252. Finally, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had improperly construed the occupational disease exclusions as "bar-[ring] coverage only for occupational disease claims brought by a policyholder's own employees and that the exclusions do not apply to complainants who developed occupational disease while using the policyholder's products in the course of working for another employer." Id., 256.

The Appellate Court rendered judgment reversing the decisions of the trial court "with respect to [its] determinations that (1) Vanderbilt is responsible for defense costs for the period of March 3, 1993 through April 24, 2007, (2) a default date of first exposure of January 1, 1962, applies to pending and future claims, and (3) the occupational disease exclusions in certain secondary policies apply only to claims brought by Vanderbilt's own employees; the proper allocation methodology and the prospective application of that methodology are clarified as set forth herein . . . ." Id., 309. The Appellate Court then remanded the case to the trial court "for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." Id. These certified appeals followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

I.

We begin with the claims of the numerous insurer defendants in the certified appeals docketed as Docket Nos. SC 20000 and SC 20001. See footnote 2 of this opinion. Specifically, they contend that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the decision of the trial court (1) adopting a "continuous trigger" theory of coverage for asbestos related disease claims as a matter of law, (2) precluding expert testimony on current medical science regarding the actual timing of bodily injury from asbestos related diseases, and (3) adopting an "unavailability of insurance" exception to the "time on the risk" rule of contract law. The insurer defendants also claim that the Appellate Court improperly interpreted pollution exclusion clauses in certain insurance policies as applicable only to claims arising from "traditional environmental pollution," rather than to those arising from asbestos exposure in indoor working environments.

After carefully examining the record on appeal and considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, we have concluded that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed with respect to these issues. The Appellate Court's thorough and well reasoned opinion more than sufficiently addresses these certified questions, and there is no need for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. We therefore adopt parts III A, III B, and IV A of the Appellate Court's opinion as the proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 331 Conn. 379, 384, 204 A.3d 664 (2019); State v. Henderson, 330 Conn. 793, 799, 201 A.3d 389 (2019).

II.

We next turn to Vanderbilt's claim, in Docket No. SC 20003, that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that occupational disease exclusion clauses in two excess policies apply to claims brought by nonemployees of Vanderbilt who allegedly developed an occupational disease while using Vanderbilt talc at any workplace. The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following additional facts and procedural history relevant to this claim. "At trial, several of Vanderbilt's secondary insurers [secondary insurers] either sought declaratory judgments determining or raised special defenses or claims alleging that occupational disease exclusions in their policies precluded coverage for some of the underlying actions. Two versions of the occupational disease exclusion, contained in policies issued by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (Lloyd's), and Pacific Employers Insurance Company (Pacific), are at issue.

"The first policy at issue, Lloyd's policy number 77/18503/1/PNB21250D, was in effect from May 17, 1977 through March 3, 1979. The policy contains an endorsement clause stating in relevant part that 'this policy shall not apply . . . to personal injury (fatal or nonfatal) by occupational disease.' Several other defendants issued secondary policies following form to the Lloyd's policy.

"The second policy at issue, Pacific policy number XMO017535 (NCA15), was in effect from March 3, 1985 through March 3, 1986. It contains the following endorsement clause: 'This policy does not apply to any liability arising out of: Occupational Disease.' National Casualty [Company (National Casualty)], [a secondary insurer that] has taken the lead in challenging the trial court's rulings regarding the occupational disease exclusions, issued an excess policy, number XU000233, which follows form to the Pacific policy. Lloyd's also issued an excess policy that follows form to the Pacific policy. None of the relevant policies defines the term 'occupational disease.'

"In addition to these occupational disease exclusions, the Lloyd's and Pacific policies contain employers' liability exclusions. The Lloyd's policy provides that 'this policy shall not apply . . . to the liability of employees.' The Pacific policy provides that '[t]his policy does not apply to personal injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured or to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of such injury.' In addition, National Casualty's excess policy, while following form to the Pacific policy, also includes its own 'employers liability exclusion,' which is somewhat broader than the one in the Pacific policy. It provides in relevant part: '[T]his policy shall not apply to any liability for bodily injury, sickness, disease, disability or shock, including death at any time resulting therefrom . . . sustained by any employee of the insured and arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured.' Last, both the Lloyd's and Pacific policies contain exclusions for obligations for which the insured may be held liable under workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, or disability benefits laws.

"To facilitate the trial court's resolution of the issue, the parties stipulated during the second phase of the trial that none of the claimants in the underlying actions [is] or ever [was a] Vanderbilt [employee]. The parties further stipulated that the underlying complaints fall into three categories: those that allege (1) exposure to Vanderbilt products solely through the workplace of another employer, (2) exposure both in and outside the workplace, and (3) exposure solely outside the workplace. Accordingly, if the occupational disease exclusions do apply to nonemployees of Vanderbilt, they likely will bar coverage for some but not all of the underlying complaints during the relevant policy years.

"In its Phase II decision, the trial court concluded that the occupational disease exclusions apply only to claims brought by Vanderbilt's own employees. Because the policies themselves do not define the term 'occupational disease,' the court looked to the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., for a definition of the term. Section 31-275 (15) provides that '"[o]ccupational disease" includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such, and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment.' The trial court concluded that the term, as defined in the statute, was unambiguous, and that it applied solely to employees of the insured. The court rejected the defendants' argument that such a construction would render the occupational disease exclusion superfluous, insofar as the employers' liability exclusions in the policies already preclude coverage for any claims of workplace injury or disease by employees of the policyholder. The court reasoned that the act draws a distinction between occupational diseases; General Statutes § 31-275 (15); and '"[p]ersonal injur[ies]"'; General Statutes § 31-275 (16); and that the policies at issue incorporate that distinction—whereas the occupational disease exclusion applies to employees of an insured who allege occupational diseases, the employers' liability exclusion applies to employees who allege that they have suffered sudden personal injuries while on the job.

"Because the court agreed with Vanderbilt that the occupational disease exclusions do not apply to any of the underlying claims, the court did not address Vanderbilt's alternative arguments that (1) in the event that the policy language is determined to be ambiguous, the exclusions should be construed in favor of the insured pursuant to the doctrine of contra proferentem, and (2) certain of the defendants have waived their right to invoke the exclusions." (Footnote added; footnote altered; footnotes in original.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 171 Conn. App. 256-59.

On appeal, the Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court's construction of the occupational disease exclusions, concluding instead that they "unambiguously bar coverage for occupational disease claims brought not only by employees of Vanderbilt but also by individuals who contracted an occupational disease in the course of their work for other employers." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 269-70. In concluding that the language of the exclusions was plain and unambiguous, the Appellate Court rejected Vanderbilt's "primary argument," namely, "that the term occupational disease is so interwoven with the concept of workers' compensation and other claims by an employee against his employer as to be meaningless outside of that particular context." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 262-63. The Appellate Court also observed that, when the policies were drafted "between the late 1970s and mid-1980s, 'occupational disease' had a common and ordinary meaning within the legal and insurance fields." Id., 263-64. The Appellate Court also relied on the rules of contract construction and noted that the employer liability exclusions were expressly limited to employees of the insured, whereas the "occupational disease exclusions are framed broadly and do not contain any similar language of limitation . . . ." Id., 269. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the occupational disease exclusions and remanded the case to the trial court with direction "to consider Vanderbilt's alternative argument that certain defendants are precluded from invoking the exclusions because they failed to timely plead the exclusions as a special defense." Id., 270.

On appeal, Vanderbilt claims that the Appellate Court improperly failed to limit the application of the occupational disease exclusions to claims brought against Vanderbilt by its own employees. Vanderbilt relies on case law and legal dictionaries; see, e.g., Ins. Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 778, 392 N.E.2d 1352, 30 Ill. Dec. 307 (1979), aff'd, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864, 52 Ill. Dec. 1 (1981); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 116 Md. App. 605, 698 A.2d 1167, cert. denied, 348 Md. 205, 703 A.2d 147 (1997); Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979); and argues that the term "'occupational disease' is a term of art that refers only to disputes between [the] employer and [the] employee or to statutory compensation plans for employees." Vanderbilt also contends that the Appellate Court's interpretation of the term "occupational disease" is inconsistent with the longstanding rules by which we construe insurance policies and their exclusions, in particular that an insurer bears a heightened burden in proving the applicability of an exclusion and that ambiguous exclusions are construed in favor of the insured. Supported by the amicus curiae National Association of Manufacturers, Vanderbilt contends that the Appellate Court's construction of the exclusion to the contrary "dramatically reduce[s] general liability coverage for manufacturers, particularly in the context of claims of disease resulting from alleged exposure to asbestos and other industrial products."

In response, National Casualty, leading the secondary insurers, argues that the occupational disease exclusions are plain and unambiguous. Citing, among other cases, Ricigliano v. Ideal Forging Corp., 280 Conn. 723, 912 A.2d 462 (2006), National Casualty contends that the phrase "occupational disease" has a plain meaning beyond the narrow workers' compensation context insofar as "an 'occupational disease' is a disease arising from engaging in one's occupation—if an employee develops a condition arising out of his or her employment, that employee has an 'occupational disease,' no matter where that employee works." (Emphasis added.) Responding to Vanderbilt's historical and contextual analysis of the term, National Casualty relies on TKK USA, Inc. v. Safety National Casualty Corp., 727 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2013), Rodriguez v. E.D. Construction, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 717, 12 A.3d 603, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 904, 17 A.3d 1046 (2011), Wyness v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 676, 525 N.E.2d 907, 121 Ill. Dec. 600 (1988), Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 623 Pa. 60, 81 A.3d 851 (2013), and United National Ins. Co. v. J.H. France Refractories Co., 36 Pa. D. & C.4th 400, 409-10 (C.P. 1996), to contend that the meaning of the phrase "occupational disease" has not changed over time "from the pre-workers' compensation era to the present"; instead, only the remedies available for such illness claims have changed, with the addition of workers' compensation coverage in the first instance. National Casualty also argues that Vanderbilt's proffered construction of the occupational disease exclusions violates rules of contract interpretation by adding nonexistent language and rendering the exclusions "redundant, as the policies at issue contain [e]mployers' [l]iability and [w]orkers' [c]ompensation exclusions that act specifically to bar Vanderbilt employees' workplace related claims." National Casualty emphasizes that the occupational disease exclusions were "stand-alone provisions outside of the base policy forms and, consequently, readily identifiable," meaning that either Vanderbilt or its sophisticated brokers, acting as its agent, "knew exactly the scope and limitations of the coverage Vanderbilt was procuring," rendering that coverage still meaningful with respect to asbestos exposure that was even partially outside the workplace. In resolving this question of first impression nationally, we agree with National Casualty and conclude that the Appellate Court properly interpreted the occupational disease exclusions to exclude occupational disease claims brought against Vanderbilt by both its employees and nonemployees.

We begin with well established principles governing the interpretation of insurance policies. "[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the [trial] court which this court reviews de novo. . . . The determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . . . In evaluating the expectations of the parties, we are mindful of the principle that provisions in insurance contracts must be construed as laymen would understand [them] and not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters and that the policyholder's expectations should be protected as long as they are objectively reasonable from the layman's point of view. . . . [W]hen the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally responsible] interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted. . . . [T]his rule of construction favorable to the insured extends to exclusion clauses. . . . When construing exclusion clauses, the language should be construed in favor of the insured unless it has a high degree of certainty that the policy language clearly and unambiguously excludes the claim. . . . While the insured bears the burden of proving coverage, the insurer bears the burden of proving that an exclusion to coverage applies." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak, 327 Conn. 225, 238-39, 173 A.3d 888 (2017); see, e.g., Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 312 Conn. 714, 740, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014) ("[U]nambiguous terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. . . . As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). But see Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Ins. Co., supra, 740-41 (noting that contra proferentem rule does not apply in disputes between insurers). "[A]lthough policy exclusions are strictly construed in favor of the insured . . . the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 796, 967 A.2d 1 (2009).

We begin with the language of the occupational disease exclusions at issue. The first policy at issue, Lloyd's policy number 77/18503/1/PNB21250D, was in effect from May 17, 1977 through March 3, 1979. The occupational disease exclusion for this policy is contained in an endorsement stating that "this policy shall not apply . . . to personal injury (fatal or nonfatal) by occupational disease." The second policy at issue, Pacific policy number XMO017535 (NCA15), was in effect from March 3, 1985 through March 3, 1986. It contains the following endorsement with an occupational disease exclusion: "This policy does not apply to any liability arising out of: Occupational Disease." Because neither of the policies at issue defines the term "occupational disease," our analysis begins with its ordinary meaning, as ascertained from dictionaries contemporary to the 1970s and 1980s, when the policies were issued. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc., 311 Conn. 29, 42 n.8, 84 A.3d 1167 (2014); R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 463, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005); Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 539, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). The Random House Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1966) p. 996, defines "occupational disease" as synonymous with "industrial disease," namely, "a disease caused by the conditions or hazards of a particular occupation." Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) pp. 1560-61, defines "[o]ccupational disease" as "an illness caused by factors arising from one's occupation . . . ." (Emphasis in original.)

Contemporaneous legal dictionaries contain similar general definitions of the term "occupational disease," along with specifically indicating the existence of a relationship between occupational diseases, as previously defined, and workers' compensation statutory schemes. Notably, the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1979 and relied on heavily by Vanderbilt, defines "[o]ccupational disease" as "[a] disease (as black lung disease incurred by miners) resulting from exposure during employment to conditions or substances detrimental to health. Compensation for such is provided by state [workers'] compensation acts and such federal acts as the Black Lung Benefits Act. Impairment of health not caused by accident but by exposure to conditions arising out of or in the course of one's employment." (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) p. 973.

The Black's Law Dictionary entry then goes on to explain that a "disease is compensable under [workers'] compensation statute as being an 'occupational' disease where: (1) the disease is contracted in the course of employment; (2) the disease is peculiar to the claimant's employment by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation or the conditions of employment result in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character from employment generally; and (3) the employment creates a risk of contracting the disease in a greater degree and in a different manner than the public generally." Id.; accord Black's Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014) p. 1248; see also Ricigliano v. Ideal Forging Corp., supra, 280 Conn. 731-32 (discussing statutory definitions of "occupational disease" under § 31-275 [15] as consistent with dictionary definitions). Although the relationship between occupational disease and workers' compensation is now a matter of black letter law, none of the definitions on which Vanderbilt relies—including the definition in Black's Law Dictionary—suggests in any way that the phrase "occupational disease" is a construct devoid of meaning outside the law of workers' compensation, notwithstanding its obvious significance within that area of the law. Instead, we read those definitions only to highlight the availability of workers' compensation as a common, legal remedy for claims arising from the underlying condition. Thus, we disagree with Vanderbilt's argument in its reply brief that "'[o]ccupational [d]isease' [is] a term of art that is tied to the employee-employer relationship," thus meaning that "no specific reference to employees needed to be added to the exclusion."

Given the lack of any verbiage in commonly used dictionary definitions expressly limiting the definition of occupational disease to the workers' compensation context, it is significant that the text of the occupational disease exclusions does not contain language expressly limiting their application to the employees of the insured. In contrast, other exclusions in the relevant policies, namely, for employer's liability and workers' compensation, expressly contain such language. This omission is significant because it indicates that, when the drafters of the policy desired to limit the application of an exclusion to a certain group of individuals, they did so. It renders all the more unambiguous the lack of any such express limitation in the occupational disease exclusions. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc., supra, 311 Conn. 54 ("[t]ypically, when different terms are employed within the same writing, different meanings are intended"); Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 259 Conn. 539-40 (use of word "sudden" in "sudden and accidental" exception to pollution exclusion was intended to preclude coverage for gradually occurring pollution, "so that only a temporally abrupt release of pollutants would be covered as an exception to the general pollution exclusion").

Indeed, to read the exclusions as urged by Vanderbilt would require us to add otherwise nonexistent language specifically limiting their application to Vanderbilt's employees, which is contrary to how we interpret contracts, including insurance policies. See Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., 252 Conn. 405, 414, 746 A.2d 1252 (2000) ("We cannot rewrite the insurance policy by adding semicolons any more than we can by adding words. If the policy had referred to 'green vehicles,' and defined that term as 'green cars, trucks or motorcycles,' it is unlikely that there would be a reasonable dispute about whether blue trucks and red motorcycles were intended to be included in the definition."); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Namerow, 257 Conn. 812, 827, 778 A.2d 168 (2001) ("The language of the policy clearly does not contain the word 'motive' or any other analogous term. Under the language of the policy, the plaintiff did not need to prove motive as an element of its claim that the defendants' loss fell within the [intentional act] policy exclusion." [Footnote omitted.]), superseded in part on other grounds, 261 Conn. 784, 807 A.2d 467 (2002); Community Action for Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 387, 403, 757 A.2d 1074 (2000) ("[t]here is nothing in the language of the exclusion to indicate that the alleged abuse or molestation must be sexually motivated or calculated to arouse the person or persons involved in the offending conduct; the boys' nonconsensual grabbing and fondling of [the victim] fall within the plain meaning of the words 'abuse' and 'molestation' irrespective of the boys' subjective state of mind"); Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, 415 (rejecting reading of "definition of '"[b]odily [i]njury"' so as to mean not merely bodily harm, bodily sickness, and bodily disease, but also nonbodily sickness and nonbodily disease" because "[t]he definition of '"[b]odily [i]njury"' in the policy does not provide: bodily harm; sickness; or disease").

We also disagree with Vanderbilt's reliance on provisions in the Lloyd's policy form, including the limits of liability and special conditions, referring to "occupational disease sustained by any employee of the assured," as "mak[ing] clear that 'occupational disease' is a type of claim that only applies to Vanderbilt's employees and is distinct from a 'product liability' claim, with separate policy limits." In the absence of a specific definition of the term "occupational disease" to that effect in the policy's definitions section, it is significant that the occupational disease exclusions at issue in this appeal are provided via endorsement, which, like a "rider . . . is a writing added or attached to a policy or certificate of insurance which expands or restricts its benefits or excludes certain conditions from coverage. . . . When properly incorporated into the policy, the policy and the rider or endorsement together constitute the contract of insurance, and are to be read together to determine the contract actually intended by the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., supra, 290 Conn. 806; see also, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc., supra, 311 Conn. 55-56. If, however, "the endorsement itself is clear and unambiguous, the content of the form policies themselves is irrelevant . . . because [e]ndorsement has also been defined generally to mean [a] written or printed form attached to the policy which alters provisions of the contract, and the word alter is synonymous with change." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., supra, 806; see id., 806-807 (concluding that summary judgment was proper, even when insurer failed to supply policy provisions beyond clear and unambiguous endorsements, because "[e]ven a policy provision that contradicts directly the terms of the endorsement is irrelevant to the disposition of the summary judgment motion"). Thus, even reading the Lloyd's provisions in harmony, the fact that the occupational disease exclusion lacks the language confining its application to Vanderbilt's employees, as found elsewhere in the Lloyd's policy, confirms further that such language was not intended to exist in the exclusion.

Although the occupational disease exclusion uses the term "occupational disease" broadly and without qualification, "[t]he breadth of this exclusion does not render it any less clear and unambiguous . . . ." Id., 800; see id., 799-800 (concluding that silicon exclusion defining "'silicon'" as "'the mineral in any form,'" excluded silicosis and silica related hazards that "cannot exist in the absence of [the element] silicon"); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 483, 697 A.2d 680 (1997) ("Because there is no requirement that a policy exclusion be cast in specific, rather than general, terms, the fact that the policy's lead exclusion contains no express reference to lead paint does not support [the insured's] contention that lead paint falls outside the purview of the exclusion. The relevant inquiry is not whether the policy issued by [the insurer] expressly excludes lead paint from its coverage but, rather, whether the language of the exclusionary provision nevertheless clearly and unambiguously applies to lead paint.").

We also acknowledge Vanderbilt's argument that the occupational disease exclusion should not be read in a way that renders the liability coverage provided by the policy meaningless. Although this argument is at first pass tempting, as noted by the Appellate Court; see R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 171 Conn. App. at 258 n.92; Vanderbilt's argument is undercut by the stipulation between the parties that, for purposes of litigating the application of the occupational disease exclusion, (1) "[n]one of the plaintiffs in any of the underlying actions allege[s] that [he or she is] or ever [was a] Vanderbilt [employee]," and (2) "[t]he underlying actions can be classified into three categories, based on the alleged exposure of the underlying plaintiff to Vanderbilt products," specifically "Category A—alleged exposure is claimed solely through workplace exposure," "Category B—alleged exposure is claimed through a combination of workplace exposure and exposure outside of the workplace," and "Category C—alleged exposure is claimed solely through exposure outside of the workplace." The stipulation provides citations to multiple exemplar cases under each category. The existence of categories B and C indicates that the Appellate Court's reading of the plain language of the occupational disease exclusion does not completely vitiate the coverage provided by the policy. Indeed, even a significant exclusion limiting available coverage does not mean that the insured did not get the coverage for which it bargained, or that the "insurance policies . . . are rendered meaningless by virtue of the denial of coverage . . . ." Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 270-71, 819 A.2d 773 (2003); see id. (no evidence that absolute pollution exclusion rendered policies "meaningless" given that they "provide coverage for a wide variety of accidents and mishaps . . . that may occur during [the plaintiff's routine business activities]" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Finally, the case law cited by the parties, none of which interprets an occupational disease exclusion, simply bears out that an occupational disease may be compensable on the first-party basis by an affected employee's workers' compensation employer, or on a third-party basis by another tortfeasor—like Vanderbilt. In particular, we disagree with Vanderbilt's reliance on the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., supra, 116 Md. App. 605, for the proposition that "the phrase 'occupational disease' cannot be interpreted outside of the employer-employee context without creating ambiguity." In that case, the court rejected an insurer's argument that a general liability policy that covered only "'accidents'" did not cover claims of asbestos related diseases resulting from workplace exposure. Id., 697; see id., 701 (concluding that inhalation of asbestos fibers "is indisputably a personal bodily injury whether or not it is also an occupational disease," thus triggering coverage because, even "if 'occurrence' and 'accident' are not precise synonyms, they are nonetheless largely overlapping terms and they include 'continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in bodily injury'"). The Maryland court distinguished the insurer's reliance on cases that have "treated 'occupational diseases,' on the one hand, and 'personal bodily injuries caused by accident,' on the other hand, as mutually exclusive categories," as "taken from the very special and statutory world of [w]orkers' [c]ompensation law. It is a body of law that is not concerned with fault or liability coverage based on fault; it is concerned with whether certain forms of disability were [job related]. Although [job related] injury and [job related] disease are slowly evolving toward a single compensable phenomenon, their respective histories have been widely divergent. That divergence has produced a number of linguistic anomalies that are peculiar to [w]orkers' [c]ompensation law." Id., 697-98. We disagree with Vanderbilt's reliance on Commercial Union Ins. Co. because that case does not interpret an occupational disease exclusion or explain why commonly used definitions of the term "occupational disease" are inherently ambiguous. Indeed, the Maryland court emphasized that, "[e]ven if 'occupational disease' and 'personal bodily injury as a result of an accident' are mutually exclusive terms in [w]orkers' [c]ompensation law, that mutual exclusivity by no means carries over into general tort law." (Emphasis added.) Id., 701.

Given the clear and unambiguous meaning of the term "occupational disease," we conclude that the Appellate Court properly construed the occupational disease exclusions to "bar coverage for occupational disease claims brought not only by employees of Vanderbilt but also by individuals who contracted an occupational disease in the course of their work for other employers." R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 171 Conn. App. at 269-70. The Appellate Court, therefore, properly reversed the decision of the trial court, which had adopted a reading of the occupational disease exclusions to the contrary.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.