Vanderbilt and insurers that had issued primary and secondary comprehensive general liability insurance policies to Vanderbilt between 1948 and 2008 disputed the coverage available to Vanderbilt under those policies for the underlying lawsuits.

Litigation ensued, and the dispute ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Connecticut. There, the insurers argued that an intermediate appellate court had improperly:

• Upheld the trial court's adoption of a "continuous trigger" theory of coverage for asbestos-related disease claims as a matter of law and the trial court's related preclusion of expert testimony on current medical science regarding the actual timing of bodily injury from such disease;
• Upheld the trial court's adoption of an "unavailability of insurance" exception to the "time on the risk" rule of contract law, which provides for pro rata allocation of defense costs and indemnity for asbestos related disease claims; and
• Interpreted pollution exclusion clauses in certain insurance policies as applicable only to claims arising from "traditional" environmental pollution, rather than to those arising from asbestos exposure in indoor working environments.

For its part, Vanderbilt claimed that the appellate court had improperly construed occupational disease exclusions present in certain policies as not limited to claims brought by Vanderbilt's own employees.

The Connecticut Supreme Court's Decision

The court affirmed.

In its decision, the court first rejected insurer arguments that the appellate court had improperly upheld the trial court's decision (1) adopting a "continuous trigger" theory of coverage for asbestos-related disease claims as a matter of law; (2) precluding expert testimony on current medical science regarding the actual timing of bodily injury from asbestos related diseases; and (3) adopting an "unavailability of insurance" exception to the "time on the risk" rule of contract law.

The court also rejected insurer contentions that the appellate court had improperly interpreted pollution exclusion clauses in certain of the insurance policies as applicable only to claims arising from "traditional environmental pollution," rather than to those arising from asbestos exposure in indoor working environments.

The court simply found that the appellate court's "thorough and well reasoned opinion more than sufficiently addresse[d] these certified questions," and that there was "no need" for it to repeat its discussion.

The court then turned to Vanderbilt's claim that the appellate court had incorrectly determined that occupational disease exclusion clauses in two excess policies applied to claims brought by nonemployees of Vanderbilt who allegedly had developed an occupational disease while using Vanderbilt talc at any workplace. In other words, Vanderbilt claimed that the appellate court had improperly failed to limit the application of the occupational disease exclusions to claims brought against Vanderbilt by its own employees.

The court affirmed the appellate court ruling on this issue, too. It explained that the policies did not define the term "occupational disease" but said that its "ordinary meaning, as ascertained from dictionaries contemporary to the 1970s and 1980s, when the policies were issued," defined it as synonymous with "industrial disease" and as "an illness caused by factors arising from one's occupation."

The court disagreed with Vanderbilt's argument that "occupational disease" was a term of art "tied to the employee-employer relationship."

The court said that, given the "clear and unambiguous meaning" of the term "occupational disease," the appellate court had properly construed the occupational disease exclusions to "bar coverage for occupational disease claims brought not only by employees of Vanderbilt but also by individuals who contracted an occupational disease in the course of their work for other employers."

The case is R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., Nos. SC 20000, SC 20001, SC 20003 (Conn. Oct. 8, 2019). Attorneys involved include: Michael J. Smith, pro hac vice, with whom were Jeffrey R. Babbin and, on the brief, Michael Menapace, Bryan W. Petrilla, pro hac vice, Laura P. Zaino, Lawrence A. Serlin, pro hac vice, Michael G. Albano, Peter R. Reynolds, Amy R. Paulus, pro hac vice, Michael L. Duffy, pro hac vice, William A. Meehan, Alexander J. Mueller, pro hac vice, Stephen T. Roberts, Robert M. Flannery, pro hac vice, Louis B. Blumenfeld, Lawrence A. Levy, pro hac vice, Matthew G. Conway, Kevin M. Haas, pro hac vice, Marianne May, pro hac vice, Michael F. Lettiero, Lawrence D. Mason, pro hac vice, John A. Lee, pro hac vice, James P. Sexton, Daniel Hargraves, pro hac vice, David A. Slossberg, John E. Rodewald, pro hac vice, and Heather L. McCoy, for the appellants in SC 20001 (defendant TIG Insurance Company et al.). John W. Cerreta, with whom were Kathleen D. Monnes and, on the brief, Erick M. Sandler, for the appellants in SC 20000 (defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al.). Jacob M. Mihm and Marilyn B. Fagelson, with whom were Proloy K. Das, Rachel Snow Kindseth and, on the brief, Stephen Hoke, for the appellant in SC 20003 and the appellees in SC 20000 and SC 20001 (substitute plaintiff). Lawrence D. Mason, pro hac vice, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Lee, pro hac vice, Michael F. Lettiero, Laura P. Zaino, Lawrence A. Serlin, pro hac vice, William A. Meehan, Alexander J. Mueller, pro hac vice, Stephen T. Roberts, pro hac vice, Robert M. Flannery, Heather L. McCoy, Jeffrey R. Babbin, Michael Menapace, Michael J. Smith, pro hac vice, Bryan W. Petrilla, pro hac vice, Matthew G. Conway, Kevin M. Haas, pro hac vice, Marianne May, pro hac vice, Louis B. Blumenfeld and Lawrence A. Levy, pro hac vice, for the appellees in SC 20003 (defendant National Casualty Company et al.). Alexander J. Mueller, pro hac vice, with whom was William A. Meehan, for the appellees (defendant Certain London Market Insurers et al.). Stephanie V. Corrao and Laura A. Foggan, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association as amicus curiae in SC 20000 and SC 20001. Michael T. McCormack filed briefs for the National Association of Manufacturers as amicus curiae in SC 20000, SC 20001 and SC 20003.