Editor's note: Tim Holt is head ofInform at Alert:24. This blog originally ran onWillisWire.

As I write, hundreds of thousands of spectators and participantswill be converging by air, sea, rail and road towards the Black Seatown of Sochi, sitting in the shadow of the now snow-ladenCaucasian Mountains and the winter sports resort of KrasnayaPolyana.

They are joined there for the duration of the Winter Olympicsand Paralympics by some 80,000 members of the Russian police, armyand intelligence services. These forces are playing for even higherstakes than the athletes: ensuring that the games are protectedfrom violence—already explicitly threatened by Islamicextremists—from a number of credible sources.

Chechen Threats

The greatest threat comes from the Caucasian Emirate, a Jihadistgroup directly descended from Shamil Basaev's Chechen Martyrs, whoharried Russian forces in the '90s during the brutal Chechenconflict. Responsible for several high-profile terrorist attacks,including the 2002 Nord-Ost theatre siege and the 2004 Beslanschool massacre, the group faded from view until their re-emergencein 2007 as the Caucasian Emirate, a radical product of NorthCaucasian grievance with the aim of establishing a caliphatethroughout the region including Dagestan and Ingushetia.

The Chechen president announced the death of their leader, DokuUmarov, in a security operation in late 2013. Regardless of thisplausible claim, Umarov's call to arms in mid-2013 was trenchantand unequivocal, urging militants to attack the games which hedescribed as “demonic dances on the bones of our ancestors”. Whilstthe level of Umarov's control amongst the many radicalised groupsin the Caucasus is questionable, his exhortations were soontranslated into violence. The 29 and 30 December saw two suicidebombs explode in Volgograd at the railway and trolley bus stationsfollowing a car bomb in nearby Pyatigorsk.

Abkhazia Vulnerability

In intercepting such threats, Russian security forces will needto be wary also of the 'break-away' republic of Abkhazia, onlykilometres away from the border. Officially part of Georgia, whichwas expelled in the war of 1992-93, it was invaded by Russia in2008—a symptom of a long historical feud between Georgia andRussia. This beautiful but often lawless territory is suited to thepassage of arms and personnel from the North Caucasus down throughthe disputed Pankisi Gorge. The Russians will have to capitalize ontheir significant influence here to deter encroachment from thisdirection.

The nature and targets of threat are entirely dependent of thesubstantial security in place. Two suggestions are of concern:

• The first is that a number of 'black widow' suicide bombers mayalready be within the 'ring of steel.'
• The second is the fact that seasoned analysts, such asSecureBio's Hamish de Bretton-Gordon OBE, assess the chemical andbiological threat as 'substantial' with the prominent threatsoriginating from hate groups, lone wolf actors and domesticterrorist groups, predominantly originating from theNorth-Caucasus.

Nationalist Threats

Others wishing to do harm can be added Russian nationalist andneo-Nazi hate groups who may target 'non-whites' orlesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender (LGBT) people and events.

Basic Crime

On a lesser, albeit distressing scale, criminality is expectedto increase. This deadly array of intent notwithstanding thedeterrent effect of this gargantuan security effort should not bediscounted.

The deflection of violence from the Olympic venues themselvesmay, however, result in attacks in the transport routes and hubsthat feed the event. It is here, amongst the crowded trains, packedhotels and airports, that terrorists may still feed off the oxygenof Olympic publicity.